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HIS Article will focus primarily on developments in Bankruptcy
Law and Creditors Rights and Remedies from the perspective of
the Texas practitioner. Significant bankruptcy developments will
be reviewed, including the sweeping changes to the Bankruptcy Code enacted by Congress last year; however, where possible, the emphasis is on
Texas law, including that arising in a bankruptcy context. This Article is
not an exhaustive survey of all bankruptcy developments in the past year,
especially those that deal with the more specialized areas of the Bankruptcy Code that do not involve some area of state law.' For recent developments that focus exclusively on bankruptcy law, the reader is
encouraged to review one of the numerous commentaries contained in
CLE materials and at least one other Texas law review. 2 Foremost
1. The author has attempted to highlight developments in the bankruptcy courts that
feature a state law "twist." If a case does not apply Texas law or feature some aspect of
interest to a state practitioner, chances are the case is not reviewed in this article. This is in
keeping with the Survey's focus on Texas law.
2. Most advanced continuing legal education courses also feature very useful summaries of recent cases. See, e.g., M. Howard, Recent Supreme Court and Circuit Court Deci-
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3
among these are the Texas Tech Law Review's Fifth Circuit Symposium
presenand Professors Warren and Westbrook's "Recent Developments"
4
tation at the University of Texas Bankruptcy Conference.
Although the author has focused on state law developments in the
bankruptcy courts, no review of bankruptcy developments would be complete without a summary of selected 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code. After that, this Article reviews bankruptcy related developments
in the Supreme Court, Fifth Circuit, and Texas Bankruptcy Courts.
Again, the focus is on bankruptcy developments of interest to a Texas
practitioner. Finally, under the heading of "Creditors' Rights", this article will review a limited number of cases of interest that are illustrative of
the problems and issues encountered by creditors and debtors. In that
regard, the reader should also review the articles elsewhere in this Survey
regarding Banking Law, Commercial Transactions, and Real Property.

I. BANKRUPTCY
A.

BANKRUPTCY REFORM

AcT

OF

1994

Congress recently passed a variety of significant amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, which took affect October 22, 1994. 5 The bill was organized into seven titles, with the
primary areas of interest being Improved Bankruptcy Administration,
sions, in TEXAS TECH UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW, ANNUAL FARM, RANCH, AND AGRI-

BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE (1994); M. White, Recent Agricultural Bankruptcy
Cases, in TEXAS TECH UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW, FARM, RANCH AND AGRI-BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE (1994); Honorable Leif M. Clark, Supreme Court Case Law Update, in
STATE BAR OF TEXAS PROF. DEV. PROGRAM,

ADVANCED CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY

COURSE (1994); Honorable Richard S. Schmidt and Julie C. Perez, Fifth Circuit and Below
Case Law, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS PROF. DEV. PROGRAM, ADVANCED CONSUMER BANK-

RUPTCY COURSE (1994); Gerrit M. Pronske, Overview of Current Case Law, in STATE BAR
OF TEXAS PROF. DEV. PROGRAM, ADVANCED BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY COURSE (1994);
Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook, Recent Developments, in UNIV. TEX. BANKRUPTCY
CONF. (1994); Lawrence P. King, S. 540 and Other New Legislation, in UNIV. TEX. BANKRUPTCY CONF. (1994).
3. The Texas Tech Law Review's annual Fifth Circuit Symposium typically features
an excellent review of bankruptcy developments in the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., Leif M.
Clark, Bankruptcy, Fifth Circuit Survey, 25 TEX. TECH L. REV. 477 (1994); John C. Akard
& M. Jo White, Bankruptcy, Fifth Circuit Survey, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV. 415 (1993).
4. Professors Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook present an update on recent
bankruptcy developments at the University of Texas Bankruptcy Conference held each
November. See Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook, Recent Developments, in UNIV. TEX.
BANKRUPTCY CONF. (1994). This article typically features synopses of dozens of cases
from throughout the country. Most recently, their focus was on the following areas: 1)
Future Claims. See, e.g., Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268 (5th Cir. 1994); In
re Piper Aircraft Corp., 168 B.R. 434 (S.D. Fla. 1994); In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R.
619 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994); see generally Ralph R. Mabey and Jamie A. Gavrin, Constitutional Limitations on the Discharge of Future Claims in Bankruptcy, 44 S.C.L. Rev. 745
(1993). 2) Executory Contracts and Leases. See, e.g., matter of Austin Development Co.,
19 F.3d 1077 (5th Cir. 1994). 3) Liability of Officers and Directors. See, e.g., In re Schepps
Food Stores, Inc., 160 B.R. 792 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993). 4) Lawyers. See, e.g., In re Perez,
30 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1994) (unsettling opinion regarding responsibility of debtor's counsel
for neutral administration of Chapter 11 case). 5) Supreme Court. 6) Partners and Partnerships. See, e.g.. In re Jones, 161 B.R. 180 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993).
5. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994).
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Commercial Bankruptcy Issues, and Consumer Bankruptcy Issues. Some
of the most significant amendments address the following issues: Chapter
13-Eligibility, Lien Avoidance, Chapter 11-Small Business, Chapter 11Single Asset, Federal Exemptions, and Case Administration. Numerous
other issues were also covered in the legislation, some of which are re6
viewed below.
1. Chapter 13 Eligibility
Congress has substantially increased the eligibility limits for Chapter
13. A debtor is now eligible for Chapter 13 relief if that person has less
than $250,000 in non-contingent, liquidated, unsecured debts, and less
than $750,000 in non-contingent, liquidated, secured debts.7 The limits
were previously $100,000 and $350,000 respectively. Although the typical
consumer Chapter 13 deals with debts substantially less than even the old
limitations, it is logical to assume that there could be somewhat of an
increase in Chapter 13 filings; Chapter 13, however, is still available only
to individuals.
2. Lien Avoidance / Exemptions
Almost hidden in the breadth of the amendments was one remnant of a
previously filed bill regarding avoidance of non-purchase money liens
against tools of the trade and implements. As reported in last year's Survey, section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code (which provides for avoidance
of non-purchase money liens against certain exempt property) had been
applied by at least one Texas bankruptcy court to allow avoidance of a
non-purchase money, non-possessory security interest in farm equipment.
This was based on a determination that farm equipment and implements
were tools of the trade and therefore exempt under the Texas Property
Code.8 Based on this holding, it became possible for a farmer to avoid a
non-purchase money lien against farm equipment and implements, which
typically secured an operating loan. Given the extent of the Texas personal property exemptions, this could affect up to $60,000 worth of property. In the short run, this was quite beneficial to a farmer who found
himself in bankruptcy. The long-term effect, however, was to deprive
6. For an excellent review of the highlights of the legislation, see Legislative Update,
13-Nov AM. BANKR. INST. J. (1994). This review of the bill features a section by section
review, with a brief summary of the net effect of each amendment. See also Lawrence P.

King, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 COLLIER

SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT,

(1994) (review

and commentary on major provisions of 1994 act by Lawrence P. King, editor in chief of
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY).

7. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988) (amended 1994).
8. See Roger S. Cox, Bankruptcy and Creditors' Rights, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
47 SMU L. REv. 749, 761-63 (1994) [hereinafter Cox, 1994 Annual Survey]. The author
reviewed Judge John C. Akard's ruling In re Davis, 148 B.R. 473 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992),
which was based in part on the Supreme Court's holding in Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305

(1991). The Texas Property Code includes "farming or ranching vehicles and implements;
...tools, equipment, books, and apparatus ... used in a trade or profession" among the

categories of personal property that may be claimed as exempt. See TEX. PROP.
ANN. § 42.002(a) (Vernon Supp. 1995).

CODE
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many farmers of a source of collateralizing a much needed operating
loan, because the threat of lien avoidance rendered farm equipment of
little or no value for securing a non-purchase money loan.
Congress has apparently attempted to address both perspectives. The
amendments have preserved the ability to avoid such a lien; however, lien
avoidance is now limited to the first $5000 in value of the covered property. Specifically, section 522(f) was amended to provide that in a case in
which state law permits a person to waive voluntarily a right to claim
exemptions and prohibits avoidance of a consensual lien on property
otherwise exempt, "the debtor may not avoid the fixing of a lien on an
interest of the debtor ... if the lien is a nonpossessory, nonpurchasemoney security interest in implements, professional books, or tools of the
trade ... to the extent the value of such implements, professional books,
tools of the trade, animals, and crops exceeds $5,000."9
The impact of this amendment on agricultural lenders and debtors is
obvious. Rather than be faced with the possibility of avoidance of up to
$60,000 worth of non-possessory, non-purchase money farm equipment
liens, the agricultural lender's exposure should now be limited to $5000.
In the long run, this should enhance credit availability for farmers now
that a lender's ability to retain a non-purchase money farm equipment
lien is greatly enhanced, even in the face of a borrower's bankruptcy filing. For those farmers whose financial situation forces a bankruptcy filing, however, the $5000 allowance still provides some limited relief.
3. Small Business Election
Congress added a so-called "small business" election that can be made
by a person engaged in commercial or business activities if that person's
aggregate, non-contingent, liquidated debts do not exceed $2,000,000.10
This would not apply, however, to a person whose primary activity is the
business of owning or operating real property (but see, the discussion of
single asset cases below). Under this election, the debtor would have the
exclusive right to file a plan for 100 days, and all plans would have to be
filed within 160 days.'1 A court may conditionally approve a disclosure
statement, and permit the solicitation of acceptances and rejections of a
plan, with the disclosure statement hearing and the confirmation hearing
12
to be combined.
Theoretically, the net effect is that the substantive law would remain
somewhat the same, but this would put small business cases on a shorter
fuse, resulting in a less expensive and time consuming proceeding. As a
practical matter, however, these amendments may provide more opportunity for litigation, expense, and uncertainty. Congress has provided little
guidance with respect to numerous unresolved issues. For example: What
9.
10.
11.
12.

11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988) (amended 1994) (emphasis added).
Id. § 101(51C).
Id. §§ 1121(e) (1)-(2).
ld. § 1125(f).
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happens after the 160 days? What if the disclosure statement is found to
be inadequate at the confirmation hearing? How is the small business
"election" effected - does it take a motion and order, can a creditor
object? These and other issues remain unresolved.
4. Single Asset Cases
One troubling issue in Chapter 11 has been the so-called single asset
real estate case, typically involving one parcel of real estate, supposedly
income-producing in nature, but facing certain foreclosure. In the case of
a "single asset real estate" bankruptcy, the new bill allows for relief from
the automatic stay, unless a plan (that has a reasonable possibility of being confirmed) is filed within ninety days, or the debtor has commenced
monthly payments to each secured creditor in an amount equal to "interest at a current fair market rate on the value of the creditor's interest in
the real interest. ' 13 The theory behind this is to avoid the filing of a
Chapter 11 on the eve of foreclosure, only to be followed by four to six
months of unreasonable delay in a case that has no expectation of reorganization. This was a major issue in many of the larger cities during the
last downturn in real estate.
5. Federal Exemptions Increased
The so-called "federal exemptions" found in the Bankruptcy Code
have been doubled.' 4 These exemptions have been of limited consequence in Texas, because the vast majority of Texas debtors choose to
rely on the Texas exemption laws. Debtors should be utilizing the federal
exemption laws more often now that the limits have increased.
6. Higher Trustee Fees Authorized
Chapter 7 trustees will now be compensated based upon monies disbursed at the rate of 25% on the first $5000 or less, 10% from $5000 to
$50,000, and 5% from $50,000 to $1,000,000, with fees of 3% for amounts
in excess of $1,000,000. This should have the positive side effect of trustees more actively administering smaller Chapter 7 cases. In the past, with
the trustee's fee essentially capped at 3%, it was unrealistic for a trustee
to administer cases with less than $10,000 in unencumbered assets, and in
many cases, trustees had been abandoning property of an even greater
value back to a debtor, rather than incur the time and expense necessary
in administering property. Now, trustees should have a greater incentive
to administer even smaller cases. Following that logic, one would also
assume that avoidance actions may be more aggressively pursued as well.
13. Id. § 362(d)(3)(B).
14. Id. § 522(d). For example, the real property limitation has been increased to
$15,000, with aggregate household furnishings, wearing apparel, etc., now set at $8000. The
wild card amount is now $800 per item and $7500 aggregate. These and other dollar
amounts are now subject to periodic inflation adjustments. Id. § 104 (3-year adjustments
based on the Consumer Price Index).
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7. Expedited Hearing on Automatic Stay

Section 362(e) is amended to provide that the final hearing on termination of the automatic stay will now be "concluded" instead of "commenced" not less than thirty days after conclusion of the preliminary
hearing. The thirty-day period may now be extended with the consent of
the parties or for a specific time that the court finds is required by compelling circumstances. 15
8.

Reaffirmation

Section 525 has been clarified to provide that a separate hearing is not
mandatory for reaffirmation of an indebtedness when the debtor is adequately represented by counsel. The amendment adds safeguards, how16
ever, to ensure that a debtor's reaffirmation is knowing and voluntary.
9. Status Conferences; Case Progress
Numerous sections were amended to provide that the court or a party-

in-interest may request a status conference and issuance of an order to
facilitate expeditious handling of a case. This includes setting a date for

filing a disclosure statement and plan, soliciting acceptance of a plan, and
17
combining the disclosure statement hearing and confirmation hearings.
Additionally, implementation of three member bankruptcy appellate
18

panels in all circuits is now provided, subject to certain exceptions.
10. Other Issues

There are numerous other issues covered in the new legislation. Some
topics of interest include the following: limitation on preference liability
of non-insider transferees, 19 perfection of purchase money security interest, 20 rejection of unexpired leases of real property, 2 ' seller's right of reclamation, 22 oil and gas production payments, 2 3 protection of post-petition
rents and hotels/motels revenues, 24 limitation on modifying residential
15. Id. § 362(e).
16. Id. § 524(c).
17. Id. § 105.

18. Id. § 158(b) (1988) (amended 1994).
19. 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b) and 550 (1988) (amended 1994). The amendment is intended
to overrule the holding in Deprizio. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re Deprizio),
874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989). The amendment provides that if a transfer is made between
90 days and one year pre-petition, the transfer is avoidable as a preferential transfer, and
was made for the benefit of a creditor who was an insider; the trustee may no longer
recover from the non-insider.
20. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988) (amended 1994); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.301(b)
(Vernon Supp. 1995). The amendment provides consistency with 20-day grace periods
found in most state versions of the UCC.
21. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988) (amended 1994). The amendment provides additional protection for lessees faced with rejection of an unexpired lease by a debtor/lessor.
22. Id. § 546. The amendment extends the 10-day time period for affecting reclamation to 20 days.
23. Id. §§ 101(42A), (56A), and 541(b)(4)(B).
24. Id. § 552(b) and 363(a).
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mortgages under Chapter 11,25 non-dischargeability of credit card payments for federal taxes, 26 curing of defaults on mortgages secured by
principal residences, 27 child support and alimony non-dischargeability, 28
jury trials, 29 security interests in aircraft equipment and vessels, 30 security
interests in rolling stock, 31 and more substantial bankruptcy crime
32
legislation.
Finally, Congress authorized the creation of a nine-member bankruptcy
review commission, which may take up to two years to investigate and
study bankruptcy problems and make formal recommendations on
needed reforms. Three members of the commission will be appointed by
the President, four by Congress, and two by the Chief Justice.
B.
1.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

Fraudulent Transfers -

ForeclosureSales

In its only significant bankruptcy decision issued during this Survey period, the Supreme Court in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.33 addressed the
issue of reasonable equivalent value in the context of a mortgage foreclosure sale. BFP, the debtor, filed bankruptcy after taking title to a home
subject to a deed of trust in favor of Imperial Savings Association. Imperial foreclosed, and the home was purchased by a third party after a properly noticed foreclosure sale. After filing bankruptcy, BFP filed a
complaint to set aside the sale to Osborne as a fraudulent transfer, claiming that the home was worth nearly twice the sales proceeds obtained at
the foreclosure.
The complaint was filed under section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code,
which permits avoidance of fraudulent transfers, including involuntary or
constructively fraudulent transfers. Essentially, section 548 permits
avoidance
if the trustee can establish (1) that the debtor had an interest in property; (2) that a transfer of that interest occurred within one year of
the filing of the bankruptcy petition; (3) that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer or became insolvent as a result
thereof; and (4) that the debtor received "less34than a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for such transfer."
25. Id. § 1123(b)(5). Modification of a mortgage covering only the debtor's principal
residence is now barred. Under Nobelman v. American Say. Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993),
it would now appear that the entire debt is treated as secured and bifurcation of the claim
would not be permitted.
26. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(14) (1988) (amended 1994).
27. Id. § 1322(c).
28. Id. §§ 101(12A), 362(b)(2), 507(a)(7), 522(f)(1)(A), 523(5), and 547(c)(7).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 157(e) (1988) (amended 1994). (Jury trials may be conducted by bankruptcy courts in certain situations, with the consent of all parties.)
30. 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (1988) (amended 1994).
31. Id. § 1168.
32. 18 U.S.C. §§ 152-154.
33. 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994).
34. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1760 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1988)).
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In BFP the Court addressed the last of those four issues (reasonably
equivalent value), on which courts of appeal had previously been divided. 35 Texas practitioners are perhaps most familiar with the Fifth Circuit's holding in Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co.,36 where

the court held that a foreclosure sale yielding fifty-seven percent (50%)
of the property's fair market value could be set aside, indicating in dicta
that any sale for less than seventy percent (70%) of fair market value
should be invalidated. 37 This resulted in the development of the so-called
"Durrett Rule," which has been applied by other courts applying section
38
548 of the Bankruptcy Code.

After a detailed analysis of the development of the law of fraudulent
transfers and the comparison of the DurrettRule with opinions issued by
the courts, 39 the Supreme Court held "that a fair and proper price, or a
'reasonably equivalent value,' for foreclosed property, is the price in fact
received at the foreclosure sale, so long as all the requirements of the

State's foreclosure law have been complied with."'40 Therefore, Durrett
has effectively been overruled' and the Supreme Court has "abandoned

any tie to the use of fair market value when analyzing validly-conducted
42

mortgage foreclosure sales under § 548(a)(2)(A)."
The Court noted, however, that its opinion did not render section
548(a)(2)(A) ineffective, because the reasonably equivalent value criteria
will continue to have some meaning outside the foreclosure context. Additionally, section 548 may continue to be a means of invalidating foreclosure sales, such as those that are conducted with intent to hinder, delay,
43
or defraud creditors.

35. Compare, Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1980)
with Matter of Bundles, 856 F.2d 815, 820 (7th Cir. 1988) and Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v.
Madrid (In re Madrid), 21 B.R. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), aff'd on other grounds,725 F.2d
1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984). "Most circuits addressing the issue have
employed a case-by-case approach, considering all of the relevant facts." Gutierrez v. Lomas Mortgage (In re Gutierrez), 160 B.R. 788, 791 n.6 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993) (citing
numerous circuit level decisions).
36. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
37. Id. at 203-04.
38. See, e.g., In re Littleton, 888 F.2d 90, 92 n.5 (11th Cir. 1989); Willis v. Borg-Warner
Acceptance Corp.(In re Willis); 48 B.R. 295, 300-01 (S.D. Tex. 1985); but cf. Gutierrez, 160
B.R. at 791 (Decisions after Durrett indicate "that the Fifth Circuit has not adopted a
mechanical, one factor analysis in the determination of reasonably equivalent value.").
39. The Court noted that it could not find another case prior to Durrett where a court
"had ever applied the 'grossly inadequate price' badge of fraud under fraudulent transfer
law to set aside a foreclosure sale." BFP, 114 S.Ct. at 1764.
40. Id. at 1765. At least one circuit' other than the Ninth Circuit had previously
reached the same conclusion. See matter of Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d 1136, 1139
(6th Cir. 1985).
41. Id.at 1761. See generally ENDING THE THREAT OF "DURRETT," 212 N.Y.L.J. 5
(1994). See also In re McGrath, 170 B.R. 78 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1994) (applying BFP to a tax
foreclosure sale).
42. In re T.F. Stone Companies, 170 B.R. 884, 891 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994).
43. BFP, 114 S.Ct. at 1765.
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The Supreme Court emphasized that its opinion was limited to mortgage foreclosures of real estate. 44 One Texas bankruptcy court has, however, applied the BFP rationale to a tax foreclosure. Chief Judge Robert
McGuire ruled in In re T.F. Stone Companies, Inc. 45 that the price obtained at a non-collusive tax foreclosure sale meets the "present fair
of the Bankruptcy Code,
equivalent value" standard of section 549(c)
46
which deals with post petition transactions.
Again realizing that BFP was issued in the context of fraudulent conveyances, the fact is that the United States Supreme Court has stated
unequivocally that the price obtained at a nonclusive foreclosure sale
conclusively establishes reasonably equivalent value. This raises the
question of whether and to what extent the Texas Property Code provisions 47 regarding possible credit for fair market value following a foreclosure sale are affected by the Supreme Court's holding. In other words,
could BFP be applied in deficiency litigation in opposition to a borrower
seeking to establish a fair market value greater than the actual sales
price? That remains to be seen.
2. Absolute Priority Rule

-

New Value Exception

In what could have been a significant case regarding the longstanding
issue of whether and to what extent a new value exception to the absolute
priority rule exists, the United States Supreme Court in U.S. Bancorp
Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership48 refused to vacate the Ninth
Circuit holding in In re Bonner Mall Partnership.49 In Bonner Mall the
Ninth Circuit described the new value exception as allowing "the shareholders of a corporation in bankruptcy to obtain an interest in the reorganized debtor in exchange for new capital contributions over the
objections of a class of creditors that has not received-full payment on its
claims."'50 The Ninth Circuit held that a plan relying on that new value
exception should be confirmed. Certiorari was granted by the Supreme
Court; however, the parties agreed to a consensual plan while the matter
was pending. The Supreme Court refused, however, to vacate the ruling
of the Ninth Circuit; the net effect of which was to leave the Ninth Circuit's acknowledgment of the new value exception standing, while expressing no view whatsoever on the issue.5 1
44. Id. at 1761 n.3.
45. In re T.F. Stone Companies, 170 B.R. 884 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994).
46. Id. at 892. See also In re McGrath, 170 B.R. 78 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1994) (applying
BFP to a tax foreclosure sale); see also 11 U.S.C. § 549 (1988).
47. See discussion infra Part III.B.2 - Deficiencies.
48. 115 S.Ct. 386 (1994).
49. 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), aff'd by, 115 S.Ct. 386 (1994).
50. Id. at 901.
51. Bonner Mall, 115 S. Ct. at 389 n.1. In In re Greystone III Joint Venture, the Fifth
Circuit's original opinion indicated that the Fifth Circuit did not recognize a new value
exception; on rehearing, however, that portion of the opinion was withdrawn. See Phoenix
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone III Joint Venture),
995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 72 (1992). In her dissent on rehearing,
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Collateral Valuation in Reorganization Proceedings

Perhaps the most significant decision of the Fifth Circuit in terms of its
practical application to most Texas bankruptcies is found in In re Rash.52
In Rash, a Chapter 13 debtor's plan was challenged as inequitable because of what the creditor claimed was an under-valuation of its collateral
for purposes of treatment in the debtor's Chapter 13 plan. The Fifth Circuit held that the debtor was required to use "retail value" for purposes
53
of valuation of an undersecured creditor's secured claim.
Because of the practical importance of this case, some review of the
facts and the court's analysis is in order. In 1989, Rash purchased a commercial truck at a retail value of $73,700. Three years later, Rash filed for
protection under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. In his plan, Rash
proposed that the creditor, Associates Commercial Corporation (ACC),
retain its lien and be paid what amounted to $28,500 plus interest at nine
percent (9%) per annum. At a hearing in bankruptcy court, ACC's expert testified that the market value of the truck was $41,000, based upon
what the expert stated was " 'what an individual, average individual off

the street' would pay for the truck

....

"54

Rash's expert testified, how-

ever, that the market value should be determined by a wholesale valuation, which he stated was $31,875. There was no dispute regarding the
retail value of the truck; rather, the experts disagreed as to whether a
retail or wholesale valuation should be used. The bankruptcy court con55
firmed the plan, adopting the measurement offered by Rash's expert.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, however, basing its holding on
its interpre56
tation of section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code. As it has in the past, the
57
Fifth Circuit attempted to determine the plain meaning of the statute.
The Fifth Circuit noted the two different approaches taken to valuation. The first being the so-called "foreclosure approach," which was folhowever, Judge Edith Jones reiterated her view that there is no new value exception in the

Bankruptcy Code. Id.at 1285.
52. Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (Matter of Rash), 31 F.3d 325 (5th Cir.

1994).
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 331.
Id. at 328.
Id.
Section 506(a) provides in pertinent part:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the
estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such
creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property ... and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest ...is less
than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in
light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of
such property ....
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
57. Matter of Rash, 31 F.3d at 328 (citing Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2246
(1992)).
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lowed by the lower courts in Rash.58 Relying on the second sentence of
section 506(a), the Fifth Circuit determined that the more appropriate
valuation is based upon the purpose of the valuation and the proposed
disposition or use of the collateral. The court referred to this as the "replacement model" of valuation.5 9 The court made the following observation: "Under this 'replacement model,' the 'value of the lien should be
based on the retail value of the collateral since such is the replacement
value to the debtor; and the costs associated with sale of the collateral
should not be deducted since no sale is contemplated.' "60
The court continued, "[w]e agree that the replacement cost approach is
the only one that gives full effect to the language of § 506(a)."'6 1 When
considering the purpose of the valuation and the proposed disposition or
use of property by the debtor, the "replacement value accounts for the
debtor's proposed use of the property, whereas foreclosure value does
not." 62
The court was also concerned with avoiding what would amount to a
windfall for the debtor. In essence, under the foreclosure approach, a
debtor could purchase an item at retail, then utilize the bankruptcy process to "knock-down the secured creditor's interest to wholesale value,
then turn around and resell the collateral at retail blue-book value and
pocket the difference. '63 The Fifth Circuit emphasized that its efforts are
focused upon preserving the party's original bargain wherever possible,
so that bankruptcy is not used "to generate a windfall for one party or the
other."64 The court concluded as follows: "Thus, retail value is the
proper measurement for purposes of determining an undersecured creditor's allowed amount of a secured claim under § 506(a). Both wholesale
valuation and techniques that average wholesale and retail values undercompensate the secured creditor and provide an invalid windfall to
65
the debtor."
The Rash opinion was issued in the context of a Chapter 13 case, and it
dealt with valuation of a motor vehicle. Nowhere in the opinion, however, does it appear that the court's reasoning is limited to Chapter 13
cases or, for that matter, to motor vehicles. Therefore, it is logical to
conclude that in the context of collateral valuation, the replacement
model or retail valuation should apply to most situations arising in cases
under Chapters 11, 12, or 13. What is not yet known, however, is whether
and to what extent this valuation should apply to valuation of items
58. See In re Rash, 149 B.R. 430, 433 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1993), rev'd, 3 F.3d 325 (5th
Cir. 1994).
59. Matter of Rash, 31 F.3d at 329.
60. Id. (quoting In re Green, 151 B.R. 501, 504 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993)).
61. l at 329.
62. Id.

63. Id. at 330.
64. Id.

65. Id. at 331 (citation omitted). As is apparent from the quote, the court disapproved
of the compromise approach taken by many bankruptcy courts. See, e.g., In re Carlan, 157
B.R. 324 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993).
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claimed as exempt in schedules filed in non-Chapter 7 cases filed by individuals. Given the breadth of the court's rationale, one can conclude that
because the exemption claim contemplates continued use by the debtor
(especially in a non-Chapter 7 case), the same logic should apply.
2. Dischargeability
a. Maintenance, Alimony, and Support
As stated elsewhere in this article, Congress has reinforced the nondischargeability of certain obligations arising out of marriage dissolution. In
two opinions issued during the Survey period, the Fifth Circuit was consistent with this approach, reiterating that obligations in the nature of
maintenance, alimony, and support are nondischargeable.
First, in Matter of Joseph66 the Fifth Circuit held that a debtor's obligation to pay his ex-wife's attorneys' fees arising out of a divorce proceeding are nondischargeable. Specifically, the debtor's ex-wife's former
lawyer intervened in a divorce proceeding, seeking a joint and several
judgment against his former client and the debtor. The divorce court ultimately rendered a judgment against both the debtor and his ex-wife for
the lawyer's fees. The husband then filed a voluntary petition under
Chapter 7. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the attorneys' fee award
would be nondischargeable if the award reflects a balancing of the parties' respective financial needs. Upon considering the disparity in earning
court conpower, relative business opportunities, and other factors, the
67
cluded that the attorneys' fee award was nondischargeable.
Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit held in In re Dennis68 that the debtor's
obligation to pay taxes on his ex-wife's interest in the debtor's retirement
benefits was in the nature of a nondischargeable support award. The
Fifth Circuit so held, despite the fact that the non-debtor spouse had successfully argued in state court that the agreement to pay taxes was part of
the property division and was not in the nature of support or alimony.
The Fifth Circuit held that collateral estoppel was not applicable, because
there was no state court finding or evidence that the parties or the state
court designed the settlement agreement and consent decree with federal
bankruptcy standards in mind. The court held that the dischargeability
issue was strictly a matter of federal bankruptcy law and not state law.
The court then relied on its earlier69ruling in Joseph and found that the tax
obligation was nondischargeable.
66. Joseph v. J. Huey O'Toole, P.C., 16 F.3d 86 (5th Cir. 1994).
67. See also In re Meadows, 75 B.R. 695 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987). "[A]n obligation to
pay attorneys' fees is so intertwined with the support obligation as to be in the nature of
alimony or support and excepted from discharge." Id. at 699.
68. Dennis v. Dennis (Matter of Dennis), 25 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 732 (1995).
69. Id. at 279.
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3. Avoidance of JudicialLiens on Homestead Property
a.

Abstracts of Judgment

In In re Henderson70 the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of whether
debtors may avoid a abstract of judgment lien against their homestead.
The court allowed the debtors to avoid the lien based upon the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of Texas law regarding the affect of judgment abstracts on a debtor's homestead.
In Henderson the debtors filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Although they were denied their discharge under section
727 of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtors moved to avoid a lien against
their homestead evidenced by an abstract of judgment. The debtors' mo71
tion was filed pursuant to section 522(f)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Under section 522, a debtor may avoid a lien on exempt property if the
debtor shows: "(1) that the lien is a judicial lien; (2) that the lien is fixed
against an interest of the debtor in property; and (3) that the lien impairs
'7 2
an exemption to which the debtor would otherwise be entitled.
The court continued, "We believe that the plain language of § 522(f)(1)
allows a debtor to avoid a lien only when the judicial lien fastens a liability to and impairs the debtor's exempt property. ' 73 Therefore, the court
had to determine whether an abstract of judgment "fixes" a lien against a
homestead and whether such a lien "impairs" the debtor's exemption
under section 522(f). The court relied on state law to determine the first
issue. The court noted that numerous Texas cases have stated that an
abstract of judgment never attaches to a homestead so long as the affected property retains its homestead character. 74 The court recognized
that it is possible to conclude that a judicial lien in Texas does not fasten a
liability on the homestead; however, "homestead property is exempt from
the enforcement of a judicial lien."'75 In other words, the homestead is not
actually exempt from the lien itself. Rather, the homestead is exempt
from any seizure attempting to enforce the perfected lien. Therefore, the
court held, the judicial lien did "fix" a liability against the debtor's
76
homestead.
70. Henderson v. Belknap (Matter of Henderson), 18 F.3d 1305 (5th Cir. 1994).
71. Section 522(f)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, . . . the debtor may avoid the
fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such
lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled
under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is . . . a judicial lien ....
11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (1988).
72. Henderson, 18 F.3d at 1308 (emphasis added).
73. Id.
74. Id. See, e.g., Hoffman v.Love, 494 S.W.2d 591 (Tex.Civ. App.-Dallas), writ ref'd
n.r.e. per curiam, 499 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1973). "[A] judgment, though duly abstracted,
never fixes a lien on the homestead so long as it remains homestead." Id.at 593-94.
75. Henderson, 18 F.3d at 1309.
76. Id.at 1309. See Exocet, Inc. v. Cordes, 815 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991,
no writ). "The debtor's homestead is not exempt from the perfected lien; rather, the
homestead is exempt from any seizure attempting to enforce the perfected lien." Id.at 352.
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The court next moved to the second issue of whether the lien "impairs"
a debtor's exemption, which was a question of federal law. The court
recognized that there was not really a legal impairment as such, but in
reviewing one Texas case, the court noted the practical effect of an abstract of judgment when an individual attempts to sell his or her homestead. The Fifth Circuit used TarrantBank v. Miller77 as an example of a
debtor who could not obtain title insurance for the purchaser of his
homestead due to an abstract of judgment. 78 Based upon the Miller example, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the "unenforceable" lien in fact
created a cloud on the debtors' title to their homestead, "making it difficult if not impossible to obtain title insurance .... ,,79 Therefore, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that the judicial lien impaired the debtor's homestead
80
and affirmed the district court's ruling that the lien should be avoided.
As a practical matter, most judgments obtained against individuals are
abstracted, resulting in the very situation presented- by the Henderson and
Miller cases discussed above. Both of these cases are required reading for
both creditors' and debtors' counsel. From the perspective of a creditor,
Tarrant Bank is instructive regarding the risk and benefit of refusing to
issue a partial release when a judgment debtor is attempting to sell a
homestead. From the debtor's perspective, however, it is important not
to overlook an opportunity to avoid a judicial lien when appropriate.
b.

"Equitable" Liens

In Matter of Parrish81 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the avoidance of an
equitable lien imposed by a Texas divorce decree. The lien was held
avoidable as a judgment lien under section 522(f), which allows a debtor
to avoid the fixing of a judicial lien on property made exempt as homestead.82 As the Parrishcourt noted, relying on Farrey v. Sanderfoot,83 the
protection of section 522(f) is limited to the extent that a debtor cannot
avoid a lien on an interest acquired after the lien attached. The court
noted that Mr. Parrish acquired the property in question through inheritance as his separate property prior to the fixing of the lien. Therefore,
the divorce decree did not create a new property interest, which made the
case distinguishable from Sanderfoot.84
77. 833 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1992, writ denied).
78. In Tarrant Bank, the state court concluded that the lien could cast a cloud on the
defendant's title. The creditor had been requested to grant a partial release in order to
allow the debtors to sell their homestead, which the creditor refused. Because of that
refusal, the title company refused to issue an owner's title policy, and the debtors were
unable to complete the sale of their home. The state court concluded there was a justiciable controversy in the subsequent suit against the creditor for slander of title. Id. at 668.
79. Henderson, 18 F.3d at 1310.
80. Id. at 1310-11.
81. 7 F.3d 76 (5th Cir. 1993).
82. Id. at 77. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(0(1) (1988).
83. 500 U.S. 291 (1991).
84. "Since Parrish's interest existed before the divorce and continued unaltered afterwards, we find that the lien attaching to that property was avoidable under section 522."
Parrish, 7 F.3d at 78.
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One example of the application of these principles is found in Judge
Sharp's treatment of the issue in In re Buffington.85 In that case, Judge
Sharp granted the debtor's motion for lien avoidance to the extent of the
debtor's one-half interest in his homestead that was vested prior to his
divorce. As to the one-half interest the debtor acquired from his ex-wife
in the divorce proceedings, the court denied the motion and granted the
ex-wife relief from the automatic stay to foreclose her lien. Effectively,
the court noted that the conveyance of the wife's one-half community
interest to the husband and the granting of the lien were simultaneous.
Therefore, lien avoidance as to that one-half interest was not
applicable. 86
4. Automatic Stay Following Repossession and Before Disposition of
Collateral
What happens if a bankruptcy is filed and a secured party or possessory
lien claimant is in possession of collateral that has not yet been sold or
otherwise disposed of? This issue presents the classic struggle between
the very broad protections provided debtors by the automatic stay of section 36287 and the right of a secured creditor for adequate protection for
its interest in an item of collateral. 88 There is no textbook answer to this
question; however, three bankruptcy court cases arising during the Survey period are illustrative of the continuing struggle, providing some guidance for parties found in this no man's land.
TWo cases 89 dealt with possessory liens under the Texas Property
Code. 90 In both of those situations, the courts balanced the debtor's protection under section 362 and the need for an item of property such as a
vehicle on the one hand, and the requirement that a secured creditor be
provided with adequate protection on the other. In both of those cases,
adequate protection was apparently a prerequisite to affording the debtor
turnover relief. In one case, the court simply refused to grant turnover
relief because of the possessory nature of the lien claim and the fact that
the debtor had not even proposed a scheme of adequate protection. 91 In
the other case, which also dealt with a possessory lien, the court granted
turnover relief to the debtor; the turnover relief, however, was condi85. 167 B.R. 833 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994).

86. Id. at 836-37.
87. Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code stays nearly all actions to enforce a debt owed
by a bankruptcy debtor, effective immediately upon the filing of the case. 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a) (1988).
88. Section 361 provides for adequate protection of a secured party's interest in property. Id. § 361. See also id. §§ 362, 363.

89. See In re Deiss, 166 B.R. 92 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1994); In re Crowe, 160 B.R. 299
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993).
90. Chapter 70 of the Texas Property Code provides liens for persons who provide
labor, materials, or other items or services. These include a worker's lien for one who
works on a motor vehicle, a stablekeepers lien, and an aircraft repairs and maintenance
lien. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 70.001-70.306 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1995).
91. Crowe, 160 B.R. at 301-02.
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tioned on a fairly complex mechanism for providing adequate
protection. 92
Before assuming that a secured creditor may always condition return of
93
the collateral upon adequate protection, one need only read In re Coats
for an example of the risk involved when a secured creditor in this position refuses to turn over property that may be subject to the automatic
stay. Coats involved a county constable attempting to enforce a judgment
held by a private party. After levying upon certain personal property, the
constable was notified of the debtors' subsequent bankruptcy filing. As a
result of the constable's refusal to surrender the property back to the
debtors, the court held that the constable had committed a willful violation of section 362 and awarded the94 debtors a substantial judgment for
actual damages and attorneys' fees.
If a conclusion can be drawn from these three cases, it would be that
courts seem reluctant to deprive a possessory lien holder of its lien position if surrendering the property without adequate protection operates to
deprive the lien claimant of its lien. 95 On the other hand, the situation
involving the constable is indicative of the risks ones faces when possibly
violating the automatic stay. The cautious secured creditor whose lien is
perfected by means other than possession would be better served in deferring to the provisions of section 362 and surrendering the collateral.
5.

DurrettRule

As discussed above, the United States Supreme Court has effectively
invalidated the so-called "DurrettRule."'96 One Texas bankruptcy court
opinion, however, is worthy of review, if for no other reason than as a
study of the nature of the Durrett Rule and a blind application thereof.
In In re Gutierrez97 Judge King, in a harbinger of things to come from the
United States Supreme Court, urged98 that the Fifth Circuit did not adopt
"a mechanical, one factor analysis" in the determination of reasonably
equivalent value in the context of a foreclosure sale. While BFPis clearly
the law of the land, Gutierrez provides a thorough analysis of the Durrett
Rule and its shortcomings and is another indication of why the Supreme
Court ruled as it did in BFP.99
92. Deiss, 166 B.R. at 94.
93. 168 B.R. 159 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993).
94. The court denied relief under § 525 (bankruptcy-related discrimination) and 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (civil rights violations) finding instead that § 362 provided the appropriate relief. Coats, 160 B.R. at 163-167. The court refused, however, to grant the constable immunity under § 362. Id at 167-68.

95. Most of the Chapter 70 liens are possessory in nature and relinquishment of pos-

sessions may destroy the lien.
96. See BFP v. RTC, 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994). See supra notes 33-47.
97. 160 B.R. 788 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993).
98. Id at 791.

99. See iU at 790-92.
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6. Property of the Estate - Disclaimers as Transfers

In Matter of Simpson' 00 the Fifth Circuit held that a debtor's disclaimer of a testamentary disposition by his father one day prior to his
bankruptcy filing was not a fraudulent transfer.' 0 ' Quite simply, the
court referred to state law concepts that the effect of a disclaimer is that
property passes as if the recipient had predeceased the testator; the net
effect of which is that the beneficiary (in this case, the debtor) never re-

ceived any property interest. 0 2 This opinion effectively overrules Judge

Clark's analysis and holding in In re Brajkovic,10 3 which was reported in
last year's Survey issue. 1 4 The holding in Simpson is consistent with

Texas common law on this issue.' 0 5
7. Property of the Estate -

Beneficial Interest in Family Trust

In In re Shurley' 6 Bankruptcy Judge Ronald King provides an extensive analysis of the effect of a partially self-settled family trust and

whether and to what extent the debtor's beneficial interest constitutes
property of the bankruptcy estate. In Shurley one of the debtors participated in the settling of a family trust, contributing a 10,000 acre ranch and
certain mineral properties (in addition to substantial other property con-

tributed by other family members). The debtor and her sister became
equal lifetime income beneficiaries of the trust with special powers of
appointment. The trust contained both spendthrift and discretionary language. The court provided a detailed analysis of the concepts of spendthrift and discretionary trusts, both of which were present in the family
trust at issue in Shurley, which the court called a discretionary spendthrift
07

trust.1

100. Simpson v. Penner, 36 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 1994). This opinion was actually issued
after the expiration of the Survey period. Because Simpson effectively overrules a case
that was reported in the last Survey issue, this case is nevertheless reported in this Survey
period.
101. The Texas Probate Code allows the recipient of a bequest for inheritance to disclaim the whole of any part of such property, i.e. decline to accept, provided the disclaimer
complies with statutory requirements and is executed within the time allowed by the statute. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37(A) (Vernon Supp. 1995). An effective disclaimer is effective as of the date of death of the decedent and relates back. Id. "The effect of the
relation back doctrine is that a beneficiary never gains possession of disclaimed property."
Simpson, 36 F.3d at 452.
102. Id.
103. 151 B.R. 402 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993).
104. Cox, 1994 Annual Survey, supra note 8, at 760.

105. See Dyer v. Eckols, 808 S.W.2d 531, 534-35 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1991, writ dism'd by agr.) (distinguishing ability to disclaim from general power of appointment; applying "relation back" doctrine to hold that a disclaimer is not a transfer in the
context of the state Fraudulent Transfer Act). See generally Sara L. Johnson, Annotation,
Creditor's Right to Prevent Debtor's Renunciation of Benefit Under Will or Debtor's Election to Take Under Will, 39 A.L.R. 4th 633 (1985).

106. Texas Commerce Bank-San Angelo, N.A. v. Shurley (In re Shurley), 171 B.R. 769
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
107. Id. at 780; see also Wilson v. United States (In re Wilson), 140 B.R. 400, 404-06
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
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Because the debtor was a settlor of the trust, the spendthrift and discre-

tionary provisions of the trust did not protect her interests, and the court
held that her entire beneficial interest in the trust constituted property of
her bankruptcy estate. 108 The self-settling nature of the trust was dispositive; however, the court went on to write that the debtor retained sufficient dominion and control over the trust assets to defeat the otherwise
protective character of the trust. The court noted that the debtors were
regularly able to obtain unrestricted distributions and loans of corpus,
and that the debtors represented Mrs. Shurley's beneficial interest in the
trust as an asset for purposes of various financial statements submitted to

creditors. The court's observations are important for purposes of analyzing family trusts and similar interests set up by individuals. Finally, because the trustee had discretion to distribute to the beneficiaries

(including Mrs. Shurley) not only property that had been settled or con-

tributed by them, but what amounted to the entire beneficial interest,
then that entire interest was available as property of the estate 1 0o 9
8. Miscellaneous

Obviously, space does not permit a review of all bankruptcy-related
developments; however, a number of other opinions deal with issues that
are of interest. Among those (in no particular order) are: unscheduled or

unnotified creditors, 110 collateral estoppel,"' interest on secured
claims, 112 modification of home mortgage," 3 who bears the cost of Chapter 13 trustee's fees," 4 bank setoff,"15 non-residential leases,"16 other executory contracts, 117 administrative priority for post-petition rents before
108. Shurley, 171 B.R. at 780-82. "No Texas case has required anything other than selfsettling to defeat a protective trust." Id. at 782 (citing Daniels v. Pecan Valley Ranch, Inc.,
831 S.W.2d 372, 378 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2944 (1993)).
109. Id. at 785-86. The court did recognize the limited special power of appointment in
the favor of the debtor as excluded from the estate under section 541(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Because Mrs. Shurley had no property left to appoint, any exercise of that
special power was rendered meaningless. Id. at 787.
110. Matter of Smith, 21 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 1994) (creditor listed in schedule but not on
mailing matrix; added to mailing matrix three years after filing - held nondischargeable);
Matter of Stone, 10 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 1994) (allowing amendment of schedules to include
unintentionally omitted creditors if no prejudice shown).
111. Sheerin v. Davis (Matter of Davis), 3 F.3d 113 (5th Cir. 1993) (state court judgment finding that debtor acted willfully and in a breach of fiduciary duty).
112. In re Collins, 167 B.R. 842 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994) (extensive analysis by Judge
Sharp regarding appropriate interest rate to be used in Chapter 13).
113. In re Sauls, 161 B.R. 794 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993) (interest on home mortgage arrearage must be paid at contract rate).
114. In re Turner, 168 B.R. 882 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994)(Chapter 13 trustee's fees
should not reduce amount of secured claim).
115. In re Appel, 166 B.R. 624 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1994) (cashier's check still in bank's
possession).
116. Compare In re CompuAdd Corp., 166 B.R. 862 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994) with In re
Mr. Gatti's, Inc., 164 B.R. 929 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
117. Eastover Bank for Sav. v. Sowashee Venture (Matter of Austin Dev. Co.), 19 F.3d
1077 (5th Cir.) (effect of rejection of lease), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 201 (1994); In re Von
Keisler, 166 B.R. 620 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994) (contract for deed).
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and after rejection, 118 exempt nature of annuities, 119 federal preemption1
12
of state exemption laws, 120 property of the estate (campaign funds),
122
and constructive trusts.
II.

HOMESTEADS AND EXEMPTIONS

A. HOMESTEADS
1.

General

As usual, Texas bankruptcy courts were a source of analysis of the nature and extent of the homestead exemption found in the Texas Property
Code and Texas Constitution. 123 Disputes regarding a debtor's assertion
of a homestead claim are sometimes quite fact intensive. In that regard,
the fact situations in two cases merit review for purposes of illustrating
some of the factual issues with which courts must deal in order to determine the validity of a homestead claim.
In In re McCain' 24 a judgment creditor objected to a Chapter 7
debtor's rural homestead. The debtor and her husband collectively
owned a 5.056 acre tract in the middle of a 28 acre platted development.
The debtor and her family moved onto the property in December of 1984;
however, both prior and subsequent to that time, a number of lots were
sold from the platted development surrounding the five acre tract. In
1987, debtor and her husband executed and recorded a written designation of homestead, designating the five acre tract as their homestead. The
development property was apparently platted, subdivided, and provided
with road access in 1977; however, the actual subdivision plat was approved and accepted in February 1990. In 1992, the First National Bank
of Linden, Texas obtained a judgment against the debtor, which was abstracted in May 1992.
A month later, the debtor filed for relief under Chapter 7. She claimed
a exemption for seventy-one acres of property which was not specifically
described in her schedules. The bank objected to the exemption. For
purposes of ruling on the objection, the court determined that the debtor
was claiming the five acre tract in addition to all remaining unsold lots in
the developed land. The court found that the debtor had conclusively
118. In re Johnston, Inc., 164 B.R. 551 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994).
119. Waldon v. McGinnes (Matter of Waldon), 12 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 1994) (annuity
purchased by employer in settlement of litigation held exempt).
120. First Gibraltar Bank, FSB v. Morales, 19 F.3d 1032 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 204 (1994).
121. In re Denton, 169 B.R. 608, 612 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.) (state representative's campaign funds held property of the estate), aff'd by, 169 B.R. 612 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
122. In re Haber Oil Co., Inc., 12 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 1994).
123. As Professors Warren and Westbrook point out, for those practicing north of the
border, it is reassuring to know that a riding lawn mower is not "furniture" in Oklahoma
and therefore not exempt. See In re Hall, 169 B.R. 732 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1994). See
generally, Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook, Recent Developments, in UNIv. TEx.
BANKRUPTCY CONF. (1994).

124. 160 B.R. 933 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1993). This opinion actually pre-dated the Survey
period; however, it was reported after the submission deadline of the previous Survey.
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established her entitlement to the five acre tract as her homestead. The
real issue, however, was the status of the development property. The
court held that the debtor was not entitled to claim a homestead interest
in the development property, notwithstanding the cutting of timber and
use of the unsold portions of land for hunting. 12 5
The court relied on Matter of Bradley126 in noting that the debtor did
exactly what the debtor in Bradley did, which was to purchase an undivided interest in a portion of development property and used that portion
of the property as her rural homestead. As to the remainder of the development property, however, there was no change in the ownership regime
or the character or use of the property, except that the debtor "may have
been on the property more frequently since she moved in much closer
proximity when her home was completed on the 5.056 acre tract."'1 27
Therefore, the debtor's actions did not support a change in intent or usage that was indicated in Bradley. The court also disregarded the fact
that the debtor owned an undivided interest in the property. The undivided nature of an ownership interest is not a factor in considering a
debtor's homestead claim, and should not hinder it.128 Apparently, the
fact that the development property had been platted and subdivided was
not directly determinative of the homestead issue. The disposition of the
other lots, however, was an issue that led the court to believe that the rest
of the developed property had not become the debtor's homestead.
Thus, the court allowed the debtor a 5.056 acre rural homestead, but disallowed the homestead interest as to the remaining development
property.
A case out of the Northern District of Texas is also instructive on many
issues that can arise out of a homestead claim. In In re Julian129 the
debtor acquired adjoining tracts known as 744 and 750 E. Jefferson Blvd.
in Dallas, Texas. He leased that property to other parties until 1974,
when he began using 744 E. Jefferson for his used car business. He continued leasing 750 E. Jefferson until 1989, when he added it to his car lot.
Meanwhile, in 1969, he had constructed a house in a rural area near
Cedar Hill, Texas, where he and his wife lived beginning in 1969.
In 1976, a loan was taken out secured by the two Dallas tracts, during
the time he lived in the Cedar Hill residence. Mr. Julian moved out of the
Cedar Hill residence in 1981, anticipating a divorce. He moved into an
apartment on the 744 E. Jefferson property, and in 1982, following his
divorce, Julian added a second story to the 744 E. Jefferson property,
which contained 2300 square feet of living space. In 1984, Julian signed a
note and deed of trust which were at issue in the instant case. The FDIC
became the holder of that note and lien, the proceeds of which were used
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 940-41.
960 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1992).
McCain, 160 B.R. at 940-41.
Id. at 941. See Sayers v. Pyland, 139 Tex. 57, 161 S.W. 2d 769, 773 (1942).
163 B.R. 478 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994).
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to pay off the earlier North Dallas bank note described above. Julian
later filed bankruptcy and claimed the 744 E. Jefferson and 750 E. Jefferson properties as his homestead. The bankruptcy court was faced with a
determination of the exempt character of both 744 and 750 E. Jefferson.
The threshold issue before the court was the validity of the FDIC's lien
on 744 E. Jefferson based upon the 1984 deed of trust. The validity of the
FDIC's liens, if any, rested upon the court's determination of the validity
of the homestead claims.
The court based its ruling on the Fifth Circuit's opinion in In re Kennard,130 where the court held that "a claimant may establish a homestead
by showing both (1) overt acts of homestead usage and (2) intent on the
part of the owner to claim the land as a homestead."'1 31 In Julian the
overt acts were clearly present, because Julian had moved into the apartment at the 744 E. Jefferson property and began constructing large living
quarters shortly thereafter. Under Kennard, "investigation of intention
need not be made when the land is actually put to homestead uses. Such
actual use of the land is the most satisfactory and convincing evidence of
intention."'1 32 Therefore, because Julian was using the property as his
33
homestead, the court found it unnecessary to investigate his intent.'
The FDIC asserted other claims regarding the debtor's statements about
the Cedar Hill property, including prior financial statements and the fact
that Julian allowed his ex-wife to remain on the Cedar Hill property until
1991 or 1992. Most significantly, Julian claimed the Cedar Hill property
as his homestead in the bankruptcy, along with the car lot and homestead
on E. Jefferson in Dallas. The FDIC asserted correctly, however, that the
debtor could not claim both an urban and rural homestead, 34 which was
resolved by a timely objection filed by the Chapter 7 trustee. The FDIC
argued that Julian continued to claim the Cedar Hill property as homestead for tax purposes. The court discounted that, finding that claiming
property as tax purposes is some indication as intent, but it is not conclusive. 135 Significantly, the court noted that Julian's invalid exemption
claim as to the Cedar Hill property evidenced "no lack of intention to
'136
claim the East Jefferson property as exempt.
Next, the court addressed the issue of estoppel. Significantly, the
FDIC asserted three acts on the part of the debtor on which to base its
estoppel claim: a homestead affidavit signed in 1987, financial statements
130. Kennard v. MBank Waco, N.A. (Matter of Kennard), 970 F.2d 1455 (5th Cir.
1992).
131. Julian, 163 B.R. at 481.
132. Kennard, 970 F.2d at 1459 (citing Lifemark Corp. v. Merritt, 655 S.W.2d 310, 314
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
133. Julian, 163 B.R. at 481. See also Napier v. FDIC (In re Napier), 144 B.R. 719
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992).
134. See First Nat'l Bank Mansfield v. Nelson (In re Nelson), 134 B.R. 838 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1991). One may "not have both a rural residence homestead and an urban business

homestead at the same time." Id. at 844; see also Farrington v. First Nat'l Bank, 753
S.W.2d 248, 251 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied).

135. Julian, 163 B.R. at 482.
136. Id.
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dated approximately two years prior to the 1984 loan, and a statement in
the 1984 deed of trust. The court allowed that under certain circumstances, a homestead claimant's declarations may estop him from claiming a homestead exemption; 137 however, the court disregarded all three
assertions, in part because the affidavit and financial statements were not
contemporaneous with the loan. Regarding the statement in the deed of
trust, the court noted that it was not conspicuous, nor was there any evidence that the bank relied upon the statement in the deed of trust. This
may not have made any difference anyway, because as the court noted,
"[a] debtor cannot be estopped by reason of a prior designation or prior
disclaimer from asserting homestead rights in land that he continuously
1 38
and openly lived on and used and occupied as his homestead."'
The adjoining tract located at 750 E. Jefferson, however, presented a
different outcome. The 750 E. Jefferson property was leased continuously to a third party until 1989, which was two years after the loan was
taken out. Although homestead property may be leased to others without abandonment, the lease must be temporary. 139 Julian's lease of this
property was not temporary, but rather "a lease of commercial property
to a third party." 14 As the court noted, the fact that the property may
have become part of the homestead in 1989 does not destroy the validity
of the 1984 lien. Therefore, the court found that the FDIC retained a
valid lien on the 750 E. Jefferson property.
Other issues remained. Recall that the loan secured by the FDIC was
used, in part, to pay off a prior loan. The FDIC asserted that it was subrogated to the liens securing the prior loan.' 4 1 The court reviewed the
principles of subrogation found in Fievel v. Zuber142 and reviewed the
facts in the instant case. Three documents in evidence included a title
company closing statement reflecting the prior note payoff, an affidavit of
debts and liens, and a transmittal letter from the title company to the
prior lender enclosing the loan proceeds and a release of lien. The court
137. Id. at 483. See, e.g., First Interstate Bank v. Bland, 810 S.W. 2d 277 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1991, no writ); see also Johnson v. Masterson Irrigation Co., 217 S.W.2d 407
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1919, writ ref'd).
138. Julian, 163 B.R. at 483; see, e.g., Kennard, 970 F.2d at 1459; Patterson v. FDIC, 918
F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1990). Perhaps one of the more notorious cases on attempted homestead disclaimers is fuman v. Deason (In re Niland), 825 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1987), which
involved John Niland, a former offensive lineman for the Dallas Cowboys. Mr. Niland
submitted a variety of false and misleading financial information to his lender in order to
obtain a lien secured by property he ultimately claimed as his homestead. The Fifth Circuit
begrudgingly allowed Mr. Niland's homestead claim, however, not without comment regarding Niland's behavior. (In his special concurrence, Judge Jolly noted the importance
of recognizing "the deplorability of the several frauds that [Niland] ... perpetrated on
several people and acknowledge the grave injustice that [was] done ....") Id. at 816.
After this analysis, the Julian court came back to the simple conclusion that Julian openly
and continuously lived on the 744 E. Jefferson property, which supported his homestead
claim and invalidated the FDIC's lien. Julian, 163 B.R. at 483.
139. Julian, 163 B.R. at 483. See In re Cooper, 128 B.R. 632, 636 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.
1991).
140. Julian, 163 B.R. at 483.
141. Id at 484.
142. 67 Tex. 275, 3 S.W. 273 (1887).
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found that the FDIC's lien position was subrogated to that of the prior
lender, 14 3 based upon what it found was long recognized Texas
precedent. 144
The deed of trust did not name a trustee. The acknowledgment on the
deed of trust was dated and signed, but it did not recite whose acknowledgment was taken. The note and lien were renewed and extended by a
subsequent document, but the copy of that document introduced into evidence did not show an acknowledgment. 145 Failure to name the trustee
did not invalidate the deed of trust, but it required the lender to seek
judicial foreclosure or alternatively, reformation before a non-judicial
sale could be held. 146 The court found the deed of trust binding between
the parties, the problem regarding the acknowledgment not147
withstanding.
Finally, the court addressed the issue of allocation of payments. Most
significant to this discussion was the allocation of principal reduction,
which the court directed would be applied to satisfaction of the lien
against the homestead (although the FDIC lien was invalidated, the prior
lien to which it was subrogated was apparently a valid lien). The court
further ruled that the FDIC must foreclose on the non-homestead property located at 750 E. Jefferson first and apply all amounts received to
satisfaction of the FDIC's note. Only thereafter would it be allowed to
foreclose the prior lien against the 744 E. Jefferson property, the lien
against which was limited to the principal remaining on the prior subrogated note. 148
2.

Urban Residential Homestead -

Multiple Lots

Judge Akard also faced two other cases involving multiple lots claimed
as homestead by debtors. In both of these cases, however, the debtors
were attempting to claim two separate residences as homestead. In both
cases, the court sustained the trustee's objection to the multiple homestead claims.
First, in In re Cate,1 49 the debtors owned a house across the street from
their residence, in which the debtors' father, mother, and sister resided.
143. Julian, 163 B.R. at 485.
144. See First Nat'l Bank v. Ackerman, 70 Tex. 315, 8 S.W. 45 (1888); Sanger Bros. v.
Ely & Walker Dry Goods Co., 207 S.W. 348, 349 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1918, writ
ref 'd).
145. Julian, 163 B.R. at 485. "Further, it is poorly drafted and the court feels it should
not be relied upon."
146. Id. at 485-86. See Kimberly Dev. Corp. v. First State Bank, 404 S.W.2d 631, 637
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
147. Julian, 163 B.R. at 486.
148. Id. at 486-87. The court's primary concern was to maximize the protection of the
homestead. "Where a lien is secured by both homestead and non-homestead property, the
debtor has a right to have the non-homestead property sold first." Id at 487. See also
Burg v. Hitzfeld, 89 S.W.2d 272, 276-77 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1935, writ dism'd)
("[e]very presumption and every fair and reasonable effort should be indulged and exercised to safeguard the homestead").
149. 170 B.R. 582 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994).
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The debtor's mother was chronically ill, his sister suffered from cerebral
palsy, and his father may have also suffered a disability. At the time of
the bankruptcy filing, the mother was deceased, the sister was in a nursing
home, and the debtor's eighty-eight year-old father remained in the
neighboring house. The debtors' claimed both their residence and the
house across the street in which the relatives resided as homestead under
state law.
The court noted that the homestead claimant bore the burden of establishing the homestead character of the property and that the claimant had
the burden of proof as to every essential fact. 150 The Cates' home and
the house occupied by Mr. Cate's father were "both urban in nature, are
located on two separate lots divided by a city street, were purchased at
separate times, and taken together do not exceed one acre."1151 The court
obviously struggled with the difficult circumstances facing the debtors;
however, the court turned to the often cited phrase of the Austin Court of
Civil Appeals that "a man may have two or more residences at the same
time, but he cannot have more than one homestead.' l5 2 The court therefore denied the debtors' homestead claim as to the house in which the
153
father resided.
On the heels of Cate, the court was faced with a somewhat similar situation in In re Nerios. 54 In Nerios the debtors purchased the house next
door to their existing home. After a few months of renting the house to
third parties, various relatives of both debtors lived in the house from
1978 through 1992. During this time, the debtors themselves never lived
in the house. In 1992, however, the debtors experienced some marital
difficulties, and Mrs. Nerios moved into the second residence. Therefore,
at the time of the bankruptcy filing, Mr. Nerios lived in one residence and
Mrs. Nerios, her sister, and her sister's son lived in the other. The debtors' daughter and her child lived in a small house located behind the first
house. Mrs. Nerios prepared the meals for the family at the second
house. Additionally, Mrs. Nerios' sister and nephew depended upon both
debtors for their support, as did the debtors' children.
Citing some of the same authority relied upon in Cate, the court concluded that the debtors were not entitled to two homesteads, notwithstanding the fact that their marriage was facilitated by living in the two
150. Id. at 583. See NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank v. Carpenter, 849 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1993, no writ); Bank of San Antonio v. Renaldo, 626 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 630 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1982).
151. Cate, 170 B.R. at 584.
152. Id. See Wootton v. Jones, 286 S.W. 680 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1926, writ dism'd
w.o.j.). As the bankruptcy court noted, however, it may be possible that the purchase of
one lot on which two houses are constructed, followed by the occupancy of one, may support a finding that both structures are homesteads. Cate, 170 B.R. at 584. See Tolman v,
Overstreet, 590 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
153. "[Tlhe courts cannot protect that which is not a homestead." Cate, 170 B.R. at 585
(quoting Whiteman v. Burkey, 115 Tex. 400, 282 S.W. 788 (1926) and Gann v. Montgomery, 210 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
154. 171 B.R. 224 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994).
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separate houses, even located on adjoining lots. The court again noted
that while homestead claims are to be given a liberal construction, courts

cannot apply such protection to property that is not a homestead.15 5 All

of the cases cited by the court refer to the residence or house in singular
terms, "implying that the homestead is meant to be comprised of only
1 56
one residence."'

3. Business Homestead -

Multiple Lots

The two cases discussed above regarding residential homesteads
notwithstanding, such a limitation may not apply to an urban business

homestead. One bankruptcy court opinion during the Survey period
points out that the business homestead exemption "may extend to two

non-contiguous lots when such lots are used as a place for the operation
of the business of the head of a family.'
4. Homestead Disclaimers -

57

Estoppel

No discussion of Texas homestead law would be complete without an
update on the ongoing battle arising from homestead disclaimers and affidavits that are executed in an effort to contravene Texas homestead laws.

Two cases arising during the Survey period provide a thorough analysis of
these issues, with a new twist from D'Oench Duhme and FIRREA.
As a general rule, a homestead claimant will not be estopped from as-

serting a homestead exemption despite the fact that the claimant may
have executed disclaimers, loan documents, or even affidavits disclaiming
homestead rights in real property in an effort to obtain a loan for pur-

poses other than purchase money, improvements, or taxes. 158 Even when

such borrowers have openly misled their lenders by executing such docu-

ments, the homestead exemption is allowed even when a "grave injustice" results as was the case in In re Niland.159 Chief Judge Robert
McGuire allowed such protection to a borrower who executed one or
more homestead affidavits disclaiming certain business property as home-

155. Id. at 227.
156. Id. at 226.
157. Hughes v. Team Bank (In re Hughes), 172 B.R. 205, 210 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993)
(citing Ford v. Aetna Ins. Co., 424 S.W.2d 612, 616 (Tex. 1968)). Both Hughes and Ford
condition the noncontiguous business homestead exemption on both lots being essential to
and necessary for the business and "not merely being used in aid of the business." Hughes,
172 B.R. at 210. "Lots which are used 'in aid of' the business, but which are not 'essential
to and necessary for' the business are not protected." Id.; see also Webb v. Reserve Life
Ins. Co. (In re Webb), 954 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1992).
158. See generally Kennard v. MBank Waco (In re Kennard), 970 F.2d 1455 (5th Cir.
1992); Patterson v. FDIC, 918 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1990); Rubarts v. First Gibraltar Bank (In
re Rubarts), 896 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1990); Truman v. Deason (In re Niland), 825 F.2d 801
(5th Cir. 1987); In re Howard, 65 B.R. 498 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986). As discussed at note
138, supra, the Niland case is perhaps the most well known, given the notoriety of the
debtor, a former professional football player.
159. Tuman v. Deason (In re Niland), 825 F.2d 801, 816 (5th Cir. 1987) (Jolly, J. specially concurring). See supra note 138.
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stead. 160 Aside from the fact that some of the funds had already been
advanced prior to the disclaimers, the basis of Judge McGuire's ruling, as
is the common thread in many of these cases, is that the debtor was in
6
continuing possession of the property in question.' '
In that same case, Judge McGuire was faced with the somewhat new
twist of whether the plaintiff's homestead claim, in light of his prior misrepresentations, was barred by D'Oench Duhme and FIRREA. The
court, relying on Patterson v. FDIC,62 held that it did not. Essentially,
Judge McGuire ruled that FIRREA was not so broad as to override substantive homestead laws, the argument being that those rights exist in63
dependent of any agreement, scheme, or misrepresentation.
The RTC, however, was successful in defeating a homestead claim in
RTC v. Olivarez,164 where the defendants had engaged in a simulated sale
to their son. Unfortunately for the parents, who were claiming the homestead exemption, they did not have record title to the property at the time
the deed of trust lien was created, which deprived them of a homestead
claim. In the absence of a valid homestead, the defendants did not even
get to the issue of estoppel. The RTC had argued, apparently successfully, that the defendants' reliance on the simulated sale was barred by
D'Oench Duhme and FIRREA.165 The Olivarez decision points out that
the ability of a homestead claimant to disregard all prior actions or misrepresentations is not unlimited. The often cited general rule is that estoppel will be applied when the owners, not occupying the property, are
using it in a manner that renders the homestead character dubious; when
owners engage in a disguised sale; or when owners represent that existing
notes are valid mechanic's lien notes or improvements secured by a prop166
erly executed mechanic's lien.
As of now, it appears that in appropriate cases, substantive homestead
law may still trump D'Oench Duhme and FIRREA (assuming the validity
of the underlying homestead claim); however, if the debtor is not in possession of the property, there is a sham or disguised sale or transaction, if
a mechanic's lien is involved, or if facts or circumstances trigger D'Oench
Duhme or FIRREA, estoppel and even D'Oench DuhmelFIRREA may
apply. Unfortunately, what is left unresolved is a balance between protecting homestead claimants (yes, even from themselves) while not en160. Hughes, 172 B.R. at 212.
161. Id.
162. 918 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1990).
163. Id. at 544-45. See Hughes, 172 B.R. at 213.
164. 29 F.3d 201 (5th Cir. 1994).
165. Id at 202-03 (citing D'Oench Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942) and
Templin v. Weisgram, 867 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989), and 12
U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988)).
166. See, e.g., Smith v. United Nat'l Bank-Denton, 966 F.2d 973, 978 (5th Cir. 1992)
(FDIC took real estate lien note and contract in good faith, for value, and without knowledge of fraud and was therefore an innocent third party purchaser that could rely on the
validity of the apparent mechanic's lien); Patterson v. FDIC, 918 F.2d 540, 547 (5th Cir.

1990).
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couraging and effectively validating knowing misrepresentations by
167
debtors that can later be disregarded.

B.
1.

PERSONAL PROPERTY EXEMPTIONS

Tools of the Trade

Judge Akard has provided another instructive opinion on the Texas Exemption Statute as it pertains to tools of the trade. In In re Legg168 the
court addressed a Chapter 7 trustee's objections to a debtor's exemption
claims regarding a front-end loader, Mack truck, radios, a radio tower,
and a trailer. The debtor had been engaged in what he called the "fertilizer business" for approximately sixteen years, and he utilized the loader,
the radios, and the Mack truck in connection with that business. The
court defined the issue as whether it is necessary for property to be
claimed as a tool of trade to be particularly adapted to a debtor's business, given that some of the property could be utilized in a variety of
other businesses.
The Legg opinion traces the development of the statutory exemption
for tools of the trade. Some of the more recent amendments added the
phrase "equipment" to the exemption and deleted requirements that the
tools of the trade be "reasonably necessary for the family."'1 69 The court
acknowledged that it had previously limited this exemption to items "peculiarly adapted to [a] trade or profession.' 170 The court concluded, however, that based upon the legislature's "ever-widening and modernizing
the Texas exemption laws," the debtor's "fertilizer business"17was a trade
for exemption purposes. The court allowed the exemption. '
Prior to the bankruptcy amendments discussed above, this opinion had
a substantial potential impact to the extent that it broadened the ability
to set aside non-possessory, non-purchase money liens in these items.
Congress has since limited the lien avoidance provisions of section 522(f)
to the first $5000 in value. Legg remains instructive, however, on the
broader issue of claiming tools of the trade as exempt under Texas law.
2. Life Insurance
As most practitioners know, Chapter 42 of the Texas Property Code
contains the personal property exemptions claimed by most debtors seeking relief under the Bankruptcy Code or from a judgment creditor. Typically, this exemption is limited at $30,000 in aggregate fair market value
for a single adult or $60,000 for a family. 172 Included in the various cate167. By the time this Survey is published, the Texas Legislature will likely have revisited
the Texas homestead exemptions. Of course, the scope and effect of what legislation is
actually passed is not yet known.
168. 164 B.R. 69 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994).
169. Id. at 72.
170. Id. See In re Nash, 142 B.R. 148, 152 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
171. Legg, 164 B.R. at 73.
172. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
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gories of property that can be claimed as exempt is "the present value of
any life insurance policy."'1 73 What may not be as widely known, however, is the unlimited exemption of insurance benefits provided under the
Texas Insurance Code. This exemption is unlimited in amount and includes "all money or benefits of any kind, including policy proceeds and

cash values

.... "174

What is less than clear is whether and to what extent there is a conflict
or inconsistency between the two Code provisions. On the one hand, the

Texas Property Code exemption statute contains the monetary limitations
described above, while the Insurance Code contains no such limitations,
and in fact is expressly "unlimited." At least three bankruptcy courts
struggled with this issue during the Survey period, reaching somewhat
inconsistent results. While it is logical to assume that by the time of publication of this article, the Texas Legislature or the Fifth Circuit may have

addressed this issue, the decisions of the three bankruptcy courts are
noteworthy.

Two cases issued virtually back to back dealt with the most basic issue
presented by the potential conflict: whether and to what extent a claim
under the Insurance Code counts against the monetary limitations in the
Property Code. Both courts recognized the unlimited nature of the ex-

emption provided by the Insurance Code; however, they reached different results with respect to the impact of that exemption on the limitations
found in the Texas Property Code.
In In re Shurley175 Judge King found that the unlimited exemption
under the Insurance Code was not subject to the limitations imposed by
Chapter 42 of the Property Code. In overruling the trustee's objections
to exemptions, the court allowed the insurance exemption without includ-

173. The specific provision includes the following: "The present value of any life insurance policy to the extent that a member of the family of the insured or a dependent of a
single insured adult claiming the exemption is a beneficiary of the policy." Id.
§ 42.002(a)(12).
174. TEx. INS. CODE ANN., art. 21.22, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1995). The Insurance Code
provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any provision of this code other than this article, all money
or benefits of any kind, including policy proceeds and cash values, to be paid
or rendered to the insured or any beneficiary under any policy of insurance
or annuity contract issued by a life, health, or accident insurance company
...or under any plan or program of annuities and benefits in use by any
employer or individual, shall: (1) inure exclusively to the benefit of the person for whose use and benefit the insurance or annuity is designated in the
policy or contract; (2) be fully exempt from execution, attachment, garnishment or other process; (3) be fully exempt from being seized, taken or appropriated or applied by any legal or equitable process or operation of law to
pay any debt or liability of the insured or of any beneficiary, either before or
after said money or benefits is or are paid or rendered; and (4) be fully exempt from all demands in any bankruptcy proceeding of the insured or
beneficiary.
Id4
175. 163 B.R. 286 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993).
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ing it in the $60,000 limitation. 176 Approximately three weeks later,
Judge Akard of the Northern District reached a somewhat different conclusion. In In re Bowes 177 the debtors sought to exempt both personal
property worth approximately $57,000 and life insurance with a cash
value of approximately $77,000. The court noted that the 1991 Texas
Legislature amended both statutes and could have deleted the reference
to insurance policy cash values from the Property Code, which it did not
do. The court allowed the debtors to claim the full $77,000 insurance cash
value under the Insurance Code; most notably, however, the court found
that the insurance exemption claim exhausted the $60,000 allowed under
178
the Texas Property Code.
Subsequent to both Shurley and Bowes, Judge Donald Sharp of the
Eastern District weighed in with his opinion in In re Young. 179 The facts
presented to the court were somewhat different and more expansive. In
Young the debtor claimed as exempt life insurance proceeds accounts totalling nearly $2,000,000. These insurance proceeds were created as a result of the death of the debtor's husband approximately two and a half
years before the debtor's bankruptcy filing. The court, noting the legislative history under the Insurance Code exemption to the effect that one
purpose of that statute was to protect surviving spouses and children,
found that the entire insurance proceeds were exempt.' 80 Moreover, the
court further held that the insurance proceeds, once paid, did not evolve
into non-exempt cash.' 8 ' The court took a somewhat different approach
to the Property Code - Insurance Code conflict regarding the cash surrender value of a policy on the life of the debtor. The Young court found
that the debtor could not have claimed the cash surrender value on the
policies in question, given the lack of "family" status for this debtor.
Thus, the court was able to distinguish Bowes, because the debtor would
not have been entitled to claim the cash surrender value under the Propof
erty Code in any event. The court nevertheless allowed the exemption
82
the cash surrender value of the policies under the Insurance Code.'
Again, all of these courts struggled with statutory construction. By the
time this Survey article is published, this problem may have been cured
176. Id. at 292-96. The court also overruled the objection to exemptions regarding the
debtor's jewelry. That had nothing to do with the insurance exception; however, it is important to note that the court clearly placed the burden regarding valuation on the objecting party, a burden the trustee failed to meet in this case. Id. at 289-91.
177. 160 B.R. 290 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993).
178. Id. at 293-94.
179. 166 B.R. 854 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994).
180. Id. at 858.
181. Id.

182. Id. at 860-61. In a footnote, Judge Sharp notes that while Bowes may have been
distinguishable in this situation, he was not necessarily in agreement with Judge Akard's
statutory construction. Judge Sharp suggested that the statutory construction aid in

§ 311.023 of the Texas Government Code, which instructs consideration of the "object
sought to be attained" would suggest that the Insurance Code provisions should prevail
over anything to the contrary in the Property Code. Id. at 861 n.9. See also TEx. GOV'T
CODE ANN. § 311.023 (Vernon 1988).
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by the Texas Legislature. As of the publication date, however, no such
cure had been introduced. From the practitioner's standpoint, however,
the importance of all three of these cases is to note the fact that there is
an additional exemption under the Texas Insurance Code, which is quite
extensive in nature and should not be overlooked.' 8 3
3. After Acquired Property
In In re Magness' 84 the debtor filed bankruptcy, inherited approximately $15,000 after the filing (which was included in the bankruptcy estate under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code), and subsequently
amended her exemptions to claim a portion of the inherited money as
exempt. 185 The bankruptcy court allowed the amendment, reasoning that
the inherited property was "property of the estate," even though it was
actually received by the debtor after the bankruptcy filing. Because it
was property of the estate, the debtor was allowed to amend her schedules to claim the exemption. 186
4. Retirement Accounts

Courts continue to struggle with the exempt nature of various retirement accounts and annuities. One relatively simple example of this struggle is found in Youngblood v. FDIC,187 in which the Fifth Circuit held
that funds rolled over from a qualified retirement account into an IRA

are exempt. The court simply referred to the Texas Property Code provision allowing "nontaxable rollover contributions.., as exempt... " and
deferred to the determination of the Internal Revenue Service that the
retirement plan from which the rollover was made was in fact a qualified

plan. 188
C.

HOMESTEADS AND EXEMPTIONS -

WHAT IS A "FAMILY"?

In United States v. Coffman18 9 the district court affirmed a ruling of the
bankruptcy court allowing a widow "family" status under the $60,000 personal property exemption allowance. 90 The court based its finding upon
183. Similarly, annuities should not be overlooked. See, e.g., Walden v. McGinnews (In
re Walden), 12 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 1994) (annuity purchased by employer in settlement of
litigation held exempt).
184. 160 B.R. 294 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993).
185. Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code includes as property of the estate any property inherited by the debtor within 180 days after the bankruptcy filing, to the extent that
property would have been includable in the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)(A) (1988).
186. Id. at 298-99. The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure allow amendment of schedules
as a matter of course at any time before the case is closed. See FED. R. BANKR. PROC. 1009
(1994).
187. In re Youngblood, 29 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 1994).
188. Id. at 227-29. "We are persuaded that the legislature intended for its own state
courts (or bankruptcy court applying Texas law) to defer to the IRS in determining
whether a retirement plan is 'qualified' under the Internal Revenue Code." Id. at 229.
189. In re Coffman, 163 B.R. 766 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994).
190. The Texas Property Code exempts from garnishment, attachment, execution, or
other seizure certain specified property in the aggregate fair market value of $60,000 for a
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similar case law and statutes regarding real property homestead exemp-

tions for surviving spouses. The court relied upon state common law regarding what comprises a family, which the court summarizes as a three-

part test: (1) the family relationship is one of social status, rather than of
contract; (2) the head of the family must be legally or morally obligated

to support at least one other family member; and (3) there must be a
corresponding dependence on the other member for this support. 19 1 This

finding is consistent with prior authority of the Fifth Circuit where a single grandmother supporting her daughter and granddaughter, both of
whom lived with her, was entitled to an entire 200-acre rural
homestead. 192

D.

TIMELY OBJECTIONS TO EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED IN BANKRUPTCY

It is worth reiterating that in a bankruptcy proceeding, an objection to
a debtor's claim of exemption must be filed within thirty (30) days after
the conclusion of the meeting of creditors. 93 The Fifth Circuit has recently applied this requirement in the context of an amendment to a previously filed schedule or claim of exemptions. In In re Sadkin194 the Fifth
Circuit has held that a debtor's amendment of its schedules does not violate an affected creditor's due process if that creditor has actual notice.
The thirty-day requirement is again triggered and the exemption will be
allowed, even if the claimed exemption is wholly without merit.' 95
III.

CREDITORS RIGHTS

Due to space limitations and in order to avoid unnecessary redundancy, this article will provide only a limited review of FDIC/RTC matters, real property foreclosure, and Article 9 issues. The FDIC/RTC
issues should be covered in the articles on banking law and real property
law, and there is some coverage of Article 9 issues in Professor Krahmer's
Commercial Transactions article.

family or $30,000 for a single adult. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 42.001 and 42.002
(Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1995).
191. Coffman, 163 B.R. at 768.
192. See Zielinski v. Hill (In re Hill), 972 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1992).
193. Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b) provides that "[t]he trustee or any creditor may file objections to the list of property claimed as exempt within 30 days after the conclusion of the
meeting of creditors ... or the filing of any amendment.., unless, within such period,
further time is granted by the court." FED. R. BANKR. PROC. 4003(b) (1994).
194. Coie v. Sadkin (In re Sadkin), 36 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 1994).
195. Id. at 475-78. Outside the 30-day period, an affected party "cannot contest the
exemption ... whether or not [the debtor] had a colorable statutory base for claiming it."
Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 112 S. Ct. 1644, 1648 (1992). "Deadlines may lead to unwelcome results, but they prompt parties to act and they produce finalit." Id. at 1648-49.
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A. FDIC / RTC

The law applicable to the FDIC and the RTC, especially that arising
under D'Oench Duhme196 and FIRREA 197 continues to develop; however, much of that development is beyond the scope of this article. This
article will highlight, however, statutes of limitation, missing interest indices, and foreclosure procedure affecting FDIC liens. As mentioned
above, much of this development is discussed in the banking law article
and to a lesser extent, in the real property article found elsewhere in this
issue. One Supreme Court case that is worthy of note, however, is that of
O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC,198 in which Justice Scalia urged a very narrow and limited application of federal common law. The effect of
O'Melveny is yet to be seen. 199
1.

Statutes of Limitation (Six-Year and Four-Year)

In its much anticipated opinion issued in Jackson v. Thweatt,2°° the
Texas Supreme Court followed what has become a substantial majority,
including the Fifth Circuit,20 1 in holding that the six-year statute of limitations accorded the FDIC applied equally to its assignees. The opinion
was issued in connection with two consolidated cases that had reached
opposite results on the issue.20 2 The court applied the new six-year statute of limitations enacted as part of the Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, commonly known as "FIRREA," which
generally provides that the statute of limitations for an action brought by
the FDIC is the longer of the six-year period beginning on the date the
claim accrues or the period under applicable state law. 20 3 Determination
of the date on which a claim accrues is based upon the later of (i) the date
receiver, or (ii) the date on
of appointment of the FDIC as conservator 2or
°4
which the cause of action actually accrues.
The argument was made that the specific references in section 1821
apply only to the FDIC and not to assignees. The court held, however,
that the FDIC's successors-in-interest are entitled to those benefits, based
on the common law principle that "[a]n assignee stands in the shoes of his
196. See D'Oench Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
197. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823 (1988).
198. 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994).
199. See generally Resolution Trust Corp. v. Maplewood Invs., 31 F.3d 1276, 1292-94
(4th Cir. 1994); see also FDIC v. Massingill, 30 F.3d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 1994).
200. 883 S.W.2d 171 (Tex.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 196 (1994).
201. See FDIC v. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1993).
202. Compare Jackson v. Thweatt, 838 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. App.-Austin), rev'd 883
S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1993) with Federal Debt Management, Inc. v. Weatherly, 842 S.W.2d 774
(Tex. App.-Dallas), rev'd 883 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1994).
203. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(A) (1988).
204. Id.
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This holding is consistent with the substantial majority of

20 6
previously reported cases.

The supreme court also noted that the other special powers accorded
the FDIC under FIRREA have long applied to assignees of the FDIC. 20 7
The court noted the public policy rationale that, "for assets to be marketable in the hands
of the FDIC, its protections must be available to
20 8
purchasers."
Finally, the court applied section 1821(d)(14) retroactively, noting that
FIRREA did not create an entirely new limitations scheme, but rather,
clarified and amended existing law under the general federal statute that
had long been in effect. 209 Although the court's statement was made in
the context of retroactivity, it is also significant in noting the Texas
Supreme Court's interpretation that the FIRREA statute did not supersede the prior federal statute of limitations, which includes provisions regarding renewed accrual on payment or written acknowledgment of the
debt 210 and even an unlimited time for establishing title to or possession
211
of property.
In per curiam opinions, the Texas Supreme Court also reversed two
similar cases from the Dallas Court of Appeals, which had previously
205. Jackson, 883 S.W.2d at 174 (citing FDIC v. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d 805, 810 (5th Cir.
1993)).
206. See, e.g., Bledsoe, 989 F.2d at 810; Davidson v. Mills, 821 F. Supp. 1176 (W.D. Tex.
1993), aff'd sub nom. Davidson v. FDIC, No. 93-8335, 1995 WL 27117 (5th Cir. Jan. 25,
1995); Mountain States Fin. Resources v. Agrawal, 777 F. Supp. 1550, 1552 (W.D. Okla.
1991); The Cadle Co. v. Matheson, 870 S.W.2d 548, 549 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1994, writ denied); Jon Luce Builder, Inc. v. Gibraltar Bank, F.S.B., 849 S.W.2d 451, 455
(Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied); Pineda v. PMI Mortgage Ins. Co., 843 S.W.2d 660,
669 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992), writ deniedper curiam, 851 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. 1993).
See also Investment Co. of the S.W. v. Reese, 875 P.2d 1086, 1091 (N.M. 1994); Central
States Resources, Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank in Morrill, 501 N.W.2d 271, 278 (Neb. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1613 (1994); Cadle Co. II, Inc. v. Lewis, 864 P.2d 718 (Kan. 1993).
See generally Brian J. Woram, FIRREA 's Statutes of Limitations: Their Availability to Purchasersfrom the FDIC, 110 BANKING L.J. 292 (1993); James J. Boteler, Comment, Protecting the American Taxpayers: Assigning the FDIC's Six Year Statute of Limitations to Third

Party Purchasers,24 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1169 (1993).
207. Jackson, 883 S.W.2d at 175; see, e.g., Victor Hotel Corp. v. FCA Mortgage Corp.,
928 F.2d 1077, 1083 (11th Cir. 1991); B.L. Nelson & Assoc. v. Sunbelt Say., 733 F. Supp.
1106, 1112 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
208. Jackson, 883 S.W.2d at 175.
209. "Retroactive application of section 1821(d)(14) is especially appropriate since it
does not create an entirely new limitations scheme, but rather merely clarifies and amends
the existing law under 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a)." Jackson, 883 S.W.2d at 177.
210. See 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1988) ("[I]n the event of later partial payment or written
acknowledgment of debt, the right of action shall be deemed to accrue again at the time of
each such payment or acknowledgment...").
211. Id. § 2415(c) ("Nothing herein shall be deemed to limit the time for bringing an
action to establish the title to, or right of possession of, real or personal property.").

"[M]ost courts have interpreted section 1821(d)(14) as well as the predecessor limitations

provision in 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) as extending to purchasers from the FDIC." Jackson, 883
S.W.2d at 174 (emphasis added). This is significant because of the other provisions of that
statute such as the provisions governing renewal, extension, and/or tolling of limitations,
unlimited limitations with respect to interests in property, and other provisions that deal
generally with limitations issues. See 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1988).
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held the state four-year statute applicable. 2 12 This should resolve all conflicts among the various courts of appeals.
2. Missing Interest Rate Index
It has long been a common practice in commercial loan transactions to
tie a variable interest rate to an index such as a "prime" rate or "base"

rate. 213 More specifically, these notes typically provide for an interest
rate that is a number of points above the applicable index rate. These
index rates are often published internally by the lending institution itself.
In the event of a failure, insolvency, or similar proceeding regarding a

bank, however, when the bank no longer exists, the index is no longer
published and essentially vanishes.
During the Survey period, opinions from the Dallas Court of Appeals
and the Fifth Circuit provide some guidance with respect to computation
of interest in the absence of such a rate. 214 At the risk of oversimplifica-

tion, it is safe to say that in the absence of such a rate, a comparable rate
will be provided. The Fifth Circuit joined other federal courts in allowing
the substitution of an assuming bank's prime rate for that of the defunct

lender,2 15 and the state court held that a "reasonable" rate of interest

should be applied. 216 The state court opinion dealt with a subsequent
holder who had purchased the note from the FDIC, and there was no

assuming or successor institution. The common thread running through
all of the opinions is that the courts will consistently apply "the Texas
217
policy of giving a reasonable construction to a note that avoids usury.
The Texas court, however, leaves open the possibility of a fact issue with

respect to what is a "reasonable" rate. Unfortunately, this may provide
an unnecessary (and perhaps unintended) impediment to disposition of
note cases by summary judgment, contrary to the admonishment of the

212. See EKA Liquidators v. Phillips, 883 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. 1994); Cadle Co. v. Weaver,
883 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1994).
213. Black's Law Dictionary defines prime rate as "the most favorable interest rates
charged by a commercial bank on short term loans to its best (i.e. most credit worthy
customers)." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 813 (6th ed. 1990). Often, a definition is found in
the note itself.
214. See FDIC v. Massingill, 24 F.3d 768 (5th Cir. 1994); Bailey, Vaught, Robertson and
Co. v. Remington Invs., Inc., No. 05-93-00911-CV, 1994 WL 521911 (Tex. App.-Dallas
Sept. 27, 1994).
215. See Massingill, 24 F.3d at 780. See also FDIC v. Blanton, 918 F.2d 524, 532 (5th
Cir. 1990); FDIC v. Law Rambla Shopping Ctr., Inc., 791 F.2d 215, 223 (1st Cir. 1986);
FDIC v. Condo Group Apartments, 812 F. Supp. 694, 699 (N.D. Tex. 1992); FDIC v. Cage,
810 F. Supp. 745, 747 (S.D. Miss. 1993).
216. Remington Invs., 1994 WL 521911, at *5.
217. Petroscience Corp. v. Hammond Geophysical, Inc., 684 S.W.2d 668, 669 (Tex.
1994) (discussing "reasonableness" and interest rates). See also Blanton, 918 F.2d at 532
n.8, where the court specifically references what is apparently a usury savings clause in the
subject note, which the court found to be the embodiment of "the intent of the parties to
comply with the usury laws ..... Id.
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federal courts, 218 where summary judgments are in appropriate circum2 19
stances encouraged by the federal courts.
Thus, these opinions have applied a common sense, but potentially incomplete, approach to this situation. Most of the case law seems to be on
the right track; however, if state law does not develop either statutorily or
through case law beyond the concept of applying a "reasonable" rate,
then courts may be left with disposing of unnecessary fact issues in cases
that should otherwise be ripe for disposition. 220 One other issue that remains unresolved is whether and to what extent a subsequent holder of a
note with a missing index is a holder in due course. The Dallas Court of
1
Appeals says no, even in the case of an FDIC assignee. 22
3.

Tax Liens vs. The FDIC

Another issue that no doubt arises in the context of failed banks is that
of ad valorem tax liens against real property collateral. The issue arises in
the context of the federal statute providing that no "property" of the
FDIC is subject to levy, attachment, garnishment, foreclosure, or sale,
without the consent of the FDIC.2 2 2 The Fifth Circuit addressed such a
situation on two occasions during the Survey period. The threshold issue
facing the FDIC was whether a lien was "property" of the FDIC, which
was necessary for the statute to apply. This was easy, however, as it has
long been settled federal law that "property" embraces both fee and lien
interests. 223 The court thus held that the taxing entities could not fore218. The Fifth Circuit has noted on more than one occasion that summary judgment is
particularly appropriate for disposition of suits on promissory notes. See, e.g., Resolution
Trlust Corp. v. Marshall, 939 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1991); FDIC v. Cardinal Oil Well Serv.
Co., 837 F.2d 1369, 1371 (5th Cir. 1988) ("lypically, suits on promissory notes provide fit
grist for the summary judgment mill.").
219. "In proper circumstances, awarding summary judgment is not disfavored in the
federal courts: 'Summary judgment reinforces the purpose of the Rules, to achieve the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of actions, and, when appropriate, affords a
merciful end to litigation that would otherwise be lengthy and expensive.' " FDIC v.
Floyd, 854 F. Supp. 449, 450-51 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (citing Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d
1190, 1197 (5th Cir. 1986)).
220. For instance, the cases cited above have been reluctant to apply the standard 6%
rate of interest that is applied under state law in the absence of an agreement, the theory
being that when an index rate was used, the parties had reached agreement on a rate. See
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1987) (In the absence of an agreement,
interest accrues at the rate of 6% per annum).
221. Remington Invs., 1994 WL 521911, at *3. The Dallas court, however, has never
done any favors for assignees of the FDIC. Recall that the Dallas court remained in the
minority on the statute of limitations issue, despite overwhelming authority to the contrary.
See Federal Debt Management, Inc. v. Weatherly, 842 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1992), rev'd, 883 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 196 (1994) (held that
assignee of FDIC did not enjoy benefits of federal 6-year statutes of limitation, contrary to
Fifth Circuit and majority of Texas appellate courts). See also EKA Liquidators v. Phillips,
883 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. 1994); Cadle Co. v. Weaver, 883 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1994), and discussion at note 201, supra.
222. 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) (1988).
223. Matagorda County v. Law, 19 F.3d 215,221 (5th Cir. 1994). According to the Fifth
Circuit, the issue was one of federal law. "No basis in law exists for treating mortgage
interests of federal instrumentalities differently from other property of the United States."
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close their liens absent FDIC consent, even in the face of a "taking" challenge by the taxing entities. 224 This holding was reiterated in a second
case 22 5 issued approximately a month later, which was consistent with
226
Matagorda County and also a prior opinion of a Texas court of appeals.
Although not directly addressed in either Fifth Circuit opinion, the reiteration that a lien constitutes "property" has other ramifications. For example, in the federal statute of limitations that predates FIRREA, there
is a virtually unlimited limitation for enforcing a property interest of the
United States. 22 7 The question then becomes whether a lien is a property
interest for purposes of applying this unlimited limitation (which has
been answered in the affirmative) and whether and to what extent such
an unlimited limitation period applies to an assignee of the FDIC. Given
the rather broad statements of both the Fifth Circuit and the Texas
statute of limitations to assignees,
Supreme Court in applying the six-year
228
one could conclude that it does.
B.

REAL PROPERTY FORECLOSURE

There were no significant developments with in the law of real property
foreclosure in the most recent Survey period to the extent that one defines a significant development as a change in the prevailing law. Three
cases, however, are worthy of note from the perspective of some of the
more common problems faced by creditors and parties with respect to
notice of sale and enforcement of deficiencies after the sale.
1.

Notice

In National Commerce Bank v. Stieh12 29 the court addressed a situation
involving notice of a foreclosure sale to makers of a second note that was
the subject of cross collateralization and cross default provisions. In
Stiehl Mr. and Mrs. Stiehl (the parents) along with their son and daughter-in-law (the Stiehl children) executed a note for $24,000. The same
day and as part of the same transaction, the Stiehl children executed a
second note in the amount of $20,000. Both notes contained cross collateralization and cross default provisions. The Stiehl children subsequently defaulted on the $20,000 note, which was secured by real estate
owned by the Stiehl children under a deed of trust executed only by the
Rust v. Johnson, 597 F.2d 174, 177 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 964 (1979); see also
Clallam County, Wash. v. United States, 263 U.S. 341 (1923).

224. Matagorda County, 19 F.3d at 223-25.
225. Donna Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Balli, 21 F.3d 100 (5th Cir. 1994).
226. See State v. Bankerd, 838 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
227. See 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1988).
228. Both the Texas Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have based their prior rulings
on the maxim that "an assignee stands in the shoes of his assignor." See FDIC v. Bledsoe,
989 F.2d 805, 810 (5th Cir. 1993); Jackson v. Thweatt, 883 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Tex. 1994). For
instance, although 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988) expressly applies only to the FDIC, its protection has generally been extended to purchasers of assets from the FDIC. Jackson, 883
S.W.2d at 175.
229. 866 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).
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Stiehl children. After notice and opportunity to cure, the bank declared
the $20,000 note in default and posted the property for foreclosure. All
notices were provided to the children, and they referenced only the
$20,000 note.
After the foreclosure sale, the Stiehl parents defaulted on the $24,000
note, and filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment relieving them from
liability on the $24,000 note because of the bank's failure to notify them
of the foreclosure sale and other actions taken regarding the $20,000
note. The court of appeals acknowledged that notice requirements under
a deed of trust are a prerequisite to the right of the trustee to conduct a
sale. 230 Specifically, the holder of the debt is required to serve the
231
"debtor in default under the deed of trust" with the required notices.
The bank served the Stiehl children (who were the debtors in default
under the deed of trust) but not the parents. The court found the notice
sufficient, because the only makers of the $20,000 note were the Stiehl
children, the parents did not guarantee or endorse the $20,000 note, the
Stiehl children were the sole grantors under the deed of trust, and the
$24,000 note had not been declared in default. Thus, the court held that
default
the notice requirements had been met, notwithstanding the cross
232
and cross collateralization provisions in the loan documents.
Similarly, in Long v. NCNB-Texas NationalBank 233 the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals held that guarantors of a note secured by realty do not
enjoy the right to notice of the foreclosure sale. The Long court also
concluded that the guarantor lacked standing to contest the validity of a
foreclosure sale in the absence of a recognized interest, 234 especially
when the guarantor has waived any requirement that the creditor first
liquidate collateral. 235 That court's opinion is worthy of note because of
among various provisions of Chapter 51 of the
its analysis of the interplay
236
Texas Property Code.
Whether and to what extent limiting notice like in these two cases is
the better practice is another question. One is only left to wonder
whether, if the Stiehl parents and the Long guarantor been notified, the
litigation could have been avoided. For example, the Stiehl parents may
have even been able to provide a solution that would have obviated the
230. Id. at 708. See Houston First Am. Sav. v. Musik, 650 S.W.2d 764, 768 (Tex. 1983).
231. Stiehl, 866 S.W.2d at 708; see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(d) (Vernon Supp.
1995).
232. Stiehl, 866 S.W.2d at 708.
233. 882 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ).
234. Id. at 867-68 ("Historically, standing to insist upon the note maker's prerogative of
personal notice of the foreclosure sale required privity of estate with the note maker.").
235. Id. at 870 (". . . an explicit disavowal of any interest in the security apparently
precludes the rights to object to the manner of the collateral's disposition."). See also T.O.
Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank of El Paso, 847 S.W.2d 218, 223 (Tex. 1992) (right to assert
impairment of collateral may be waived in guaranty contract).
236. Long, 882 S.W.2d at 865-66. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 51.002, 51.003, and
51.005 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
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need for a foreclosure sale. While the courts' rulings were clearly correct,
counsel should always err on the side of notice.
2. Deficiencies
In Lester v. FirstAmerican Bank23 7 the court addressed the issues arising out of the 1991 amendments to the Texas Property Code that now
provide for credit against a deficiency based on the fair market value of
property foreclosed. As amended in 1991, the Property Code now provides that a defendant in a suit for a deficiency following a non-judicial
foreclosure can request determination of whether and to what extent the
property's fair market value at the date of foreclosure exceeded the sales
price. 238 If the court determines that the value exceeded the sales price,
then the difference between the two amounts is offset against the deficiency. 2 39 Under Lester, those amendments have survived their first constitutional challenge.
In Lester the lender relied on two prior Texas Supreme Court cases
that had found a similar statute unconstitutional, because it impaired the
obligation of contract, thus violating the contract clause of the Texas Constitution. 240 Subsequent to the issuance of those two opinions, however,
the United States Supreme Court had addressed similar legislative enact24 1
ments and held that those statutes did not violate the contract clause.
The net effect of those holdings is that statutes such as the one in question
do not deprive a mortgagee of its contractual rights. Essentially, allowing
a factfinder to make a determination regarding the value of the foreclosed property does not violate that right.242 In Lester the court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the mortgagee, however, because
there was a material issue of fact regarding the fair market value of the
2 43
real property.
C.

OVERDRAFT CHARGES REVISITED

As reported in last year's Survey issue, 244 the Houston Court of Appeals, First District, ruled that overdraft charges could constitute usury.
237. 866 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied).
238. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003(b) (Vernon 1995). See also supra text following

note 46.
239. Lester, 866 S.W.2d. at 362. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003(c) (Vernon Supp.
1995).

240. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16. The two cases on which the lender relied had held
what was then known as the Texas Moratorium Act and the Texas Anti-Deficiency Judgment Law unconstitutional. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 124 Tex. 45, 76 S.W.2d 1007
(1934); Langever v. Miller, 73 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1934, writ denied).
241. See Gelfert v. National City Bank of N.Y., 313 U.S. 221 (1941); Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539 (1939); Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co., 300 U.S. 124 (1937).
242. "Mortgagees are constitutionally entitled to no more than payment in full. [footnote omitted] They cannot be heard to complain on constitutional grounds if the Legislature takes steps to see to it that they get no more than that." Gelfert, 313 U.S. at 233.
243. Lester, 866 S.W.2d at 368.
244. Cox, 1994 Annual Survey, supra note 8.
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Since then, the Supreme Court granted writ of error and reversed on that
issue.
In First Bank v. Tony's Tortilla Factory, Inc.2 45 the Texas Supreme
Court determined that overdraft charges (referred to in the opinion as
"NSF fees") did not fit within the definition of interest, and therefore
would not be considered usurious, at least in the context of the case
before it. The court first noted the statutory definition of interest as
"compensation for the use, forbearance, or detention of money. '246 For a
transaction to be usurious, "[tihere must be (1) a loan of money; (2) an
absolute obligation to repay the principal; and (3) the exaction of a
than allowed by law for the use of the money by
greater compensation
'247
the borrower.
The court recognized, however, that fees based upon additional charges
supported by separate and additional consideration are not considered
interest.2 48 With respect to overdraft charges, the court noted that in the
case before it, the fees were assessed as processing fees for the additional
work necessary and were charged to all customers inthe same amount,
regardless of whether a check was paid or rejected. Furthermore, there
was no relationship between the amount of the NSF fee and the amount
of the funds advanced, if any. The court further noted that whether and
to what extent the fees were profitable to the bank does not make the fee
usurious. Because the fees were for consideration other than the lending
of money, the court held that the fees were not usurious, and it rendered
judgment that the plaintiffs take nothing against the bank on the usury
claim.24 9

D.

RECOVERY ON LOST NOTE

Bean v. Bluebonnet Savings Bank FSB250 does not provide any new

developments; however, it is noteworthy as a reminder that a creditor
may recover on a lost note, regardless of its status of a "holder." In Bean
the appellate court affirmed a summary judgment, reiterating that "[t]o
recover on a promissory note, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the note in
question, (2) the party sued signed the note, (3) the plaintiff is the owner
or holder of the note, and (4) a certain balance is due and owing on the
note."'251 The court reiterated the Texas UCC provision that an owner
245. 877 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. 1994).
246. Id. at 287. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.art. 5069-1.01(a) (Vernon 1987).
247. Tony's Tortilla Factory,877 S.W.2d at 287. "Usury statutes are penal in nature and
should be strictly construed." Id
248. Id. See, e.g., Texas Commerce Bank-Arlington v. Goldring, 665 S.W.2d 103, 104
(Tex. 1984) (attorneys' fees); Stedman v. Georgetown Say. & Loan Ass'n, 595 S.W.2d 486,
489 (Tex. 1979) (loan commitment fee); Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Egand, 126 Tex. 160,
166-67, 86 S.W.2d 722, 724-25 (1935) (prepayment penalty).
249. Tony's Tortilla Factory, 877 S.W.2d at 288.
250. 884 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ).
251. Id at 522. See also Cockrell v. Republic Mortgage Ins. Co., 817 S.W.2d 106, 111
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ); Sorrells v. Giberson, 780 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex. App.Austin 1989, writ denied).
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may recover on a lost promissory note simply by proving that the note is
lost and by proving the terms of the obligation.2 52 Absent controverting
evidence, affidavit testimony together with a true and correct copy of the
note proves ownership in the context of a summary judgment. 25 3 When
the note is being enforced by a subsequent holder, the subsequent holder
need only provide affidavit testimony to establish transfer of ownership
by negotiation or assignment. The net effect of this is that a plaintiff need
not be a holder in due course to recover on a lost note. Although this is
well established law, judicial resources continue to be wasted in litigating
issues pertaining to "holder" and "holder in due course" status, which in
the absence of personal defenses to a note often have nothing whatsoever
to do with enforcement. In Bean the debtor's only argument to the appellate court was that the plaintiff did not prove that it was a holder, a
holder in due course, or a federal holder in due course. He did not plead
any personal defenses, however, so the holder issues had nothing whatso25 4
ever to do with the plaintiff's recovery.

E.

PARTNERS AND PARTNERSHIPS -

STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS

Any state practitioner who questions the extent to which bankruptcy
courts are involved in development of substantive state law need read no
further than In re Jones,255 in which the court addressed the question of
whether and to what extent limitations runs in an action against general
partners in a partnership against which a judgment was already rendered.
In Jones the bankruptcy court held that following a timely judgment
against a general partnership, limitations begin to run against the individual partners only when the judgment against the general partnership becomes final. Apparently, this holding was based upon the entity theory of
partnerships under which "it is logical that a partner has no liability until
the partnership liability is established. '256 The court went on to note that
the plaintiff or creditor was not precluded from suing the partnership and
the partners at the same time, but failing that, "there is nothing wrong
with the partnership being sued and, if its liability is established, a subsequent suit being filed against the partners on their personal liability for
the partnership's obligation. '257 This holding is consistent with
the Fifth
2 58
Circuit's ruling in a partnership case involving Louisiana law.
252. Bean, 884 S.W.2d at 522. See TEx. Bus. & CoM.

1994).

CODE

ANN. § 3.804 (Vernon

253. Bean, 884 S.W.2d at 522. See also Zarges v. Bevan, 652 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Tex.
1983).
254. Bean, 884 S.W.2d at 523.
255. 161 B.R. 180 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993).
256. Id. at 183.
257. Id. "Once the liability of the-partnership became fixed, the only issue remaining
was whether the Defendants are partners of [the partnership]." Id at 184.
258. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. St. Jude Hosp. of Kenner, La., Inc., 37 F.3d 193 (5th Cir.
1994). In this case, a hospital was sued along with a partnership. The hospital was not
named, however, in its role as a general partner in the partnership. After a judgment was
entered against the partnership, but awarding nothing against the hospital, the plaintiff
subsequently sued the hospital based upon its liability as a general partner. The hospital
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COMMERCIAL

REASONABLENESS

Since the Texas Supreme Court issued its opinion in Greathouse v.
CharterNational Bank-Southwest,259 there appears to have been a reduction in the number of reported cases regarding disposition of personal
property collateral by a secured creditor after default. This Survey period
was no exception. Two federal cases, however, reflect some new twists on
commercial reasonableness, and one Texas case is instructive on how not
to dispose of collateral and expect to preserve a deficiency.
The first of the two federal cases comes out of the Fifth Circuit in Steinberg v. Cinema N' Drafthouse Systems, Inc.,260 where the Fifth Circuit
distinguished between the rights of a "debtor" as opposed to a guarantor.
More specifically, the court held that a guarantor could waive the otherwise unwaivable provisions of section 9.504,261 which requires a secured
creditor to dispose of collateral after default in a commercially reasonable manner. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that four Texas courts of
appeals and a panel of the Fifth Circuit had held that a guarantor could
not waive prior to default the notice required under section 9.504. Instead, the Fifth Circuit followed reasoning found in an opinion of the
First Circuit, which distinguished between protections accorded a debtor
(as opposed to a guarantor) by the proscription of waiver being counterbalanced by the "riskier transaction requiring the involvement of a guarantor. '262 The net effect is that the Fifth Circuit has held that the guarantor of a secured transaction may waive a right to commercially reasonable
disposition of collateral, unlike the debtor, whose ability to waive such a
requirement remains limited.
In Gordon & Associates v. Cullen Bank/CityWest26 3 the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals provides an instructive analysis of the various aspects of
commercially reasonable disposition of collateral, notice of public and/or
private sale, sales expenses, accountings to debtor, and purchase by secured party (and the restrictions of such purchase at a private sale).
While the opinion contains no real development or change in substantive
law, it is nevertheless instructive, especially when one considers that the
disposition occurred during litigation, presumably with access to counsel
asserted res judicata, arguing that the claim should have been brought in the first suit. The
Fifth Circuit held that under Louisiana law, the partnership claim was separate and distinct. Id. at 196-97.
259. 851 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. 1992).
260. 28 F.3d 23 (5th Cir. 1994).
261. TEX. Bus. & COM.CODE ANN. § 9.504 (Vernon 1991) (addresses a secured party's
right to dispose of collateral and also sets certain standards for notice of public and private
sales). This non-waiver provision is found in § 9.501(c). See also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 9.501(c) (Vernon 1991).
262. Steinberg, 28 F.3d at 25. The Fifth Circuit cited the First Circuit's reasoning in

United States v. H&S Realty Co., 837 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1987), and analogized the situation faced by the Texas Supreme Court in FDIC v. Coleman, 795 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1990)
(guaranty agreement waived "good faith" provision found in § 1.203 of Texas Business &
Commerce Code).
263. 880 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ).

BANKRUPTCY

19951

and some court oversight. 264 One potentially confusing statement is
found, however, in a footnote where the court makes the statement that
Greathouse makes it "abundantly clear that a creditor must plead and
prove" commercially reasonable disposition. 265 While this is not an incorrect statement, the footnote fails to note that a mere allegation to the
have been satisfied may still suffice in
effect that all conditions precedent
266
the face of a general denial.
Greathouse and its progeny are instructive, as is Article 9, when it
comes to the sale or disposition of collateral. .The issue that is not so
specifically addressed, however, is what happens when a creditor decides
not to sell collateral that it has repossessed. In FDIC v. Floyd267 the
court concluded that a creditor in possession of corporate stock violated
no duty to the debtor when it made the decision not to sell the stock. The
court acknowledged that provisions of Article 9 require reasonable care
in the preservation of collateral; 26 however, none of the duties imposed
upon a secured creditor, including the general duty to dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner, imposed an affirmative duty
that the creditor must sell the collateral.269 The reader is cautioned, however, that the Floyd case involved corporate stock, and it remains to be
seen whether this apparent lack of a duty would apply in all situations
and to all types of collateral.
IV. CONSUMER CREDIT
A. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
The saga of whether and to what extent the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 270 applies to lawyers continues; however, there may be an end in

sight. The Sixth Circuit has held that the act does not apply to lawyers
engaged solely in the practice of law, 27 1 stating that to apply the act to all
lawyers "would produce absurd outcomes." 272 The Supreme Court has,
however, granted certiorari to review a Seventh Circuit decision to the
264. See generally id at 95-98.

265. Id. at 98 n.5.
266. See Greathouse, 851 S.W.2d at 176-77; see also Love of God Holiness Temple
Church v. Union Standard Ins. Co., 860 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ
denied) (This case did not deal with Article 9; however, it cites Greathouse for this
proposition).
267. 854 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
268. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.207 (Vernon 1991) ("[a] secured party must
use reasonable care in the custody and preservation of collateral in his possession").
269. The court distinguished its holding from that in F.O. Roquemore v. National Commerce Bank, 837 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ), in which the secured party sold stock after the price of the stock had dropped significantly. The
distinguishing fact in Roquemore was that the creditor actually sold the collateral, which
carried with it the burden of proving the commercial reasonableness of that sale. Roquemore found that the creditor had no duty to liquidate the stock and noted the irony that
had the creditor not sold the stock, it would have satisfied its collateral preservation duty
under § 9.207. See Roquemore, 837 S.W.2d at 217.
270. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1982).
271. Green v. Hocking, 9 F.3d 18 (6th Cir. 1993).
272. Id. at 21.
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contrary. 273 The Seventh Circuit recognized some of the myriad

problems with regulating lawyers in their debt collection efforts; however,
the court found that the statute, as amended in 1986, was broad enough
to include lawyers in their debt collection activities, including litigation.274 Hopefully, the Supreme Court's review of this decision may provide some guidance in this area so that future "absurd outcomes" foretold
by the Sixth Circuit can be avoided.

273. Jenkins v. Heintz, 25 F.3d 536 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 416 (1994).
274. Jenkins, 25 F.3d at 539.

